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THE NEW OHIO MENTAL
HEALTH ACT
INTRODUCTION
0 N AUGUST 26, 1976, the new Ohio Mental Health Act' became effec-
tive. The Act makes sweeping changes, both procedural and substan-
tive; in the law concerning the treatment of the mentally ill in Ohio. The
new" law affects every aspect of treatment and defines and limits the ability
of the state to insist upon treatment. In addition, the law establishes guide-
line for the process of commitment, manner of treatment, mode of confine-
ment and rights of the mentally restored.
The revision of the statute appears to be a product of several sources
of cificism thai had been aimed at the prior statute. The Citizens Task Force
Report on Mental Health and Mental Retardation,2 which was prepared in
1971 by a special commission appointed by former Governor Gilligan,
sfiply criticized the level of care and treatment existing in the state insti-
tutions:
Further criticism is found in the opinion of In re Fisher,' decided by
the Supreme Court of Ohio in 1974. In that case, indigent patients had
been involuntarily committed to Hawthornden State Hospital and sought
to secure their release through a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the
state's failure to appoint counsel at their commitment hearings was a denial
of due process under the fourteenth amendment of the United States Con-
stitution. The Court decided in favor of the petitioners and, in a rather
lengthy opinion, also found fault with other aspects of the Ohio civil com-
mitment procedure. The court noted that:
(1) the state did not require that the individual sought to be committed
receive personal notice of any commitment hearings;
(2) the presence of the individual at the hearings was discretionary;
(3) the statute failed to require that an adequate record be maintained
for purposes of judicial review;
(4) there was no standard of proof required to justify commitment;
(5) the court was not required to explore less restrictive treatment
alternatives;
(6) the proceedings were subject to a number of evidentiary abuses.'
'Act of May 27, 1976, H.B. 244, 111th General Assembly (1975-1976).
2CIzIENs TASK FORCE ON MENTAL HEALTH AND RETARDATION, FINDINGS AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS: DESIGN FOR A COORDINATED SYSTEM FOR THE MENTALLY ILL AND MENTALLY RE-
TARDED IN OHIO (1971) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE].
3 39 Ohio St. 2d 71, 313 N.E.2d 851 (1974).
' Id. at 79, 313 N.E.2d at 857.
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The third influence appears to have been a general nationwide disen-
chantment5 with the "medical model"' of civil commitment statutes, which
tends to emphasize the doctor's role in prescribing and administering treat-
ment. The problem with this model is not that medical practitioners are
called upon to diagnose and treat mental illness-for no one could rationally
argue that courts are equipped or competent to perform this task-but that
the decision of whether to provide treatment is left solely in the hands of
the doctors. In contrast to this approach, the new statute is patterned after
the "legal model." This model seeks to give mentally ill individuals more
choice in determining the course of their own treatment by making the
procedures that lead to involuntary hospitalization more adversarial in char-
acter and by permitting commitment only after a judicial determination
that it is necessary.7
The purpose of this comment is to highlight the new procedural and
substantive rights that are now guaranteed to the person sought to be com-
mitted for mental illness. The writers seek to evaluate it against a background
of social and medical desirability, as well as constitutional mandates. One
should keep in mind that our current method of dealing with the mentally
ill is by no means either universal or necessary. Other societies have used
different methods; some have been less compassionate, while others have
been more so." In order to attempt to place Ohio's law in this broad per-
spective, the writers have drawn upon the writings of commentators as
well as judicial opinions and statutory law from other jurisdictions.
5 See, e.g., Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113 (D. Hawaii 1976), where the court
notes that the medical model had been in effect in Hawaii a scant six years before it came
under persistent attack by civil libertarian groups and added:
While mistreatment of some patients is alleged, the impetus for the attack is probably
more properly ascribed to a growing disillusionment' with the medical model in all
fields of behavioral control of human beings, the impact of recent decisions of the fed-
eral courts, and the ongoing skepticism of civil libertarians with all forms of enforced
assistance.
6 This label is somewhat of a misnomer. In case of physical illness it is the medical practi-
tioners who practice medicine, but-absent an emergency-it is the patient who determines
whether or not to accept treatment. Thus, a pure "medical model" type of legislation would
leave the decision of treatment solely to the patient and would permit no compulsory treat-
ment or confinement. However, when the term is applied to commitment statutes, it appears
to mean that the question of whether or not to force treatment on a person is left with doc-
tors rather than with judges, juries and lawyers.
See Involuntary Treatment of the Mentally Ill in Iowa: The 1975 Legislation, 61 IowA
L. REv. 261, 266 (1975). The need for safeguards exists only when the question of invol-
untary commitment arises, for it is only then that there is a question of forcible treatment.
When a person seeks treatment on his own, there is no state interference and the traditional
doctor-patient relationship-what amounts to the pure "medical model"-exists.
8 During the colonial period, for instance, the mentally ill
were expelled from towns along with paupers generally, and ...wandered about in
bands, subject to the whims and, sometimes, cruelties of a society that equated both
mental illness and idleness with moral turpitude . . . .For these persons, it was un-
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I. WHO Is SUBJECT TO THE NEW ACT
The Ohio Revised Code, prior to the amendments discussed herein,
defined both a "mentally ill individual"9 and a "mentally ill individual sub-
ject to hospitalization by court order,"'10 and incorporated the first term
into the latter definition. A person who was, or who believed himself to be,
mentally ill could be eligible for voluntary hospitalization. 1 If, in addition,
he was likely to injure himself or others, or was unable to make a responsible
decision in regard to treatment, and either of these conditions existed because
of his illness, the person was subject to coerced confinement. 2 The new
legislation replaces the definition of "mentally ill individual" with a definition
for "mental illness"'3 and redefines "mentally ill individual subject to hospital-
ization by court order,' 1 4 but it retains the two-tiered standard that existed
under the old law. Thus, each of the two new definitions must be examined
in order to determine which persons are subject to the statute.
A. Definition of "Mental Illness"
If the concept of mental illness as statutorily defined were solely a
standard by which to base eligibility for voluntary treatment, any vagueness,
ambiguity, or possible overbreadth in its applicability would be of little
concern; in fact, giving a broad scope to the term could be beneficial
in that the greatest possible number of people who desired treatment would
doubtedly more merciful to erect institutions, and to confine the mentally incapacitated
for their own safety. They were helpless to survive for long outside of an institutional
environment.
Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1086 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded on
other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974).
In contrast to such inhumane treatment, the mentally ill in rural Ghana are rarely con-
fined to mental hospitals, although such care is available. Instead, those afflicted with mental
illness are cared for by their relatives and physically restrained only during episodes of
violent behavior. D. BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF LAW 120 (1976).
9 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.01 (A) (Page 1970) (amended 1976) defined a "mentally
ill individual" as
an individual having an illness which substantially impairs the capacity of the person to
use self-control, judgment, and discretion in the conduct of his affairs and social rela-
tions, and includes "lunacy", "unsoundness of mind", "insanity", and also cases in which
such lessening of capacity for control is caused by such addiction to narcotics, sedatives,
alcohol, or stimulants as to make it necessary for such person to be under treatment,
care, guidance, or control.
10 Id. § 5122.01 (B) defined a "mentally ill individual subject to hospitalization by court
order" as
a mentally ill individual who, because of his illness, is likely to injure himself or others
if allowed to remain at liberty, or is in need of care or treatment in a mental hospital,
and because of his illness lacks sufficient insight or capacity to make responsible deci-
sions with respect to his hospitalization.
"Id. § 5122.02 (A).
2 Id. § 5122.01 (B).
1s OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5122.01 (A) (Page Supp. 1976).
It Id. § 5122.01 (B).
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be covered by the Act. However, the import of the term is greatly magnified
when it is recalled that the presence of mental illness is an integral part of
the criteria for compulsory hospitalization. Even if a person were found to
represent a substantial risk of harm either to himself or to the community,
he could not be adjudicated a "mentally ill person subject to hospitalization
by court order" and subsequently confined without the initial finding of
mental illness as the causal factor.15
"Mental illness," as defined in the new statute, means "a substantial
disorder of thought, mood, perception, orientation, or memory that grossly
impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability to meet
the ordinary demands of life."16 Although the similarities between this defini-
tion and the prior definition of a "mentally ill individual" are apparent,"
the new definition appears to be more precise and more psychologically
oriented. The non-medical terms such as "lunacy," "unsoundness of mind,"
and "insanity" are excluded, as is the reference to lessening of capacity for
one's control caused by addiction to alcohol or drugs, which necessitates
treatment or guidance. 8
The present definition, however, contains words that leave room for
much interpretation. For example, how substantial must "substantial" be;
and what is the criterion for "grossly" impaired judgment or behavior? Is
the standard one's own previous judgment and behavior or does an objective
standard exist against which one is to be measured? Also, what are the
"ordinary demands of life" that one is to meet? Unless these demands include
only the basic necessities of life, they may be construed differently depending
upon one's lifestyle. However, these terms may not be less precise than the
"reasonable man" standard found in tort law or the "substantial evidence"
test that is used as a standard to review administrative decisions, terms
to which the courts ultimately give content. While undoubtedly grey areas
will exist where it will be difficult to determine if a person is indeed mentally
ill, extremes at either end of the spectrum can be recognized and identified
more easily.
Another definitional problem is that "mental illness" is stated to mean
a disorder of the mind-thought, mood, perception, orientation, or memory-
which affects behavior. Many psychologists argue, however, that mental ill-
ness is in fact a condition which is diagnosed from behavior that deviates
15 See statutory definition set out in text accompanying note 10 supra.
16 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.01 (A) (Page Supp. 1976).
If See note 9 supra.
18 Orno REV. CODE Ar. § 5122.041 (A) (Page Supp. 1976) provides for the establishment
of "special facilities which shall be reserved for the study, care, treatment, counseling, re-
habilitation, and aftercare of drug dependent persons or persons in danger of becoming drug
dependent."
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from the norm, rather than a separate condition of the mind that can be
isolated from behavior.19
Since mental illness is deemed inseparable from behavior, and behavior
is evaluated against that which is normal, critics have argued that the concept
is far too subjective to be used as the basis for the massive curtailment of
liberty that results from civil commitment. 2' The diagnostician measures
symptomatic behavior against his own ideas of normality; thus a clinician
with a different set of standards may well find no mental illness, or may
find a different disease.2" Such variations become intolerable in light of the
possible consequences involved.
In order to objectify the standard, one writer has suggested that "a
commission of experts [be] appointed to establish and regularly update
criteria for diagnosis of presence of mental illness derived from such precise
factors as psychiatric examination, psychological examination, and biochemi-
cal testing."2 Desirable as this may be in the abstract, its accomplishment
may be impossible. Mental illness is so complex that, with the exception of
the relatively few cases that can be traced to organic sources, the experts
themselves have not yet settled on any firm criteria for diagnoses.2"
Until such objective criteria are developed, the use of the adversary
system to enlighten the judgment of the court must suffice. However, since
the statute entitles the person who is allegedly mentally ill to both counsel
and independent expert evaluation, " he has an effective opportunity to
challenge the evidence presented against him. Independent evaluation should
result in more careful and less biased assessment of the person's medical
'o See In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 665 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (most mental illness defined and
measured in terms of behavioral deviance); R. LAING, THE POLITICS OF THE FAMILY ANDOTHER ESSAYS 43-45 (1967) [hereinafter cited as LING]; J. RoBrrsCdER, PURSUIT oF-AGREE-
MENT: PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 133 (1966) ("psychiatric commitment is a form of social
control"); T. SzAsz, THE MANUFACTURE OF MADNESS 34-35 (1970); Hardisty, Mental Illness:A Legal Fiction, 48 WASL L. REV. 735, 737 (1973) (psychiatrists'use the phrase "mentalillness" to achieve social purposes rather than to describe a medical -condition); Livermore,
Malmquist & Meehl, On the Justification for Civil Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 75, 80(1968) ("Mhe definition of mental illness is left largely to the user and is dependent upon
the norms of adjustment that he employs"); Roth, Dayley & Lerner, Into the Abyss: Psy-
chiatric Reliability and Emergency Commitment Statutes, 13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 400,- 407-11(1973) (application of the term "mental illness" is dependent on such factors as age, sex,financial position and lifestyle); Comment, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87
Hi~v. L. REV. 1190, 1255'(1974) [hereinafter cited as Civil Commitment].
20 Civil Commitment, supra note 19, at 1256.
2 1 Id. at 1255.
22 Comment, Reforming the Mental Health Law of Ohio, 7 AKRON L. REV. 475, 489 (1974).
23 The problem is further complicated by the fact that probably everyone is a bit schizoid;
the difference between sickness and health is a matter of degree. In fact; "the persons called
upon to judge the presence of insanity may not be of entirely sound mind themselves. In re
Pickles, 170 So. .2d 603, 614 (1965).
24 OHIO REV. CODE ANN, § 5122.05 (C) (2) (Page Supp. 1976).
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condition." It is also usually the most effective rebuttal to the committing
physician's description of the person's mental condition." Furthermore, it
has been documented that fewer people are committed in cases in which an
attorney actively represents his client's best interests" since such representa-
tion forces the court to consider the matter more carefully."
B. Definition of "Mentally Ill Person Subject to Hospitalization
by Court Order"
In O'Connor v. Donaldson,9 the Supreme Court of the United States
determined that a bare finding of "mental illness" does not justify civil
commitment. The Court said:
A finding of "mental illness" alone cannot justify a State's locking a
person up against his will and keeping him indefinitely in simple
custodial confinement. Assuming that the term can be given a reason-
ably precise content and that the "mentally ill" can be identified with
reasonable accuracy, there is still no constitutional basis for confining
25 In a non-adversarial system, medical examiners often spend little time examining the per-
son who is alleged to be mentally ill; one study showed that interviews last from five to
seventeen minutes, with the mean time being 10.2 minutes. T. SCHEFF, BEING MENTALLY
ILL: A SOCIOLOGIcAL THEORY 144 (1966). The physicians tended to assume that there was
mental illness present. One said, "If the patient's own family wants to get rid of him, you
know there is something wrong." Id. at 149. Most examinations result in a finding of mental
illness, regardless of the behavior exhibited during the interview. Id. at 128-68; LAING,
supra note 19, at 33; de Grazia, The Distinction of Being Mad, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 339,
343 (1955). In less than a third of the cases that resulted in commitment were the statutory
criteria fully met. SCHEFF, supra, at 143.
26 S. SCHWARTZ & D. STERPN, A TRIAL MANUAL FOR CIVIL COMMITMENT (1977), excerpted in
I MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 380, 385 (1977). Counsel for the respondent may also attempt
to discredit the adverse testimony by bringing out on cross-examination the fact that the
diagnosis and predictions of psychiatrists are unreliable. For an example of this technique,
see Dixon & Blondis, Cross-Examination of Psychiatric Witnesses in Civil Commitment Pro-
ceedings, 1 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 164, 168-69 (1976).
27 Civil Commitment, supra note 19, at 1285.
2SUsually the court has rubber-stamped the finding of the medical examiner. When the Ohio
statute required only an affidavit containing a statement that the patient was "mentally ill"
and needed "immediate hospital treatment," many courts relied on a bare allegation of mental
illness to order involuntary hospitalization. In fact, when a hospital in Cleveland began
submitting fuller reports in order to give the court a broader range of information upon which
to make a finding, one court requested that the hospital return to the old method of report-
ing, evidently because the court believed that it would be a waste of time to review informa-
tion that it was unqualified to analyze. Strand, Legal Aid for Patients in State Mental Insti-
tutions: The Cleveland Experience, 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 483, 485 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Strand].
The court may justify such cavalier disposal of the cases by the widely-held idea that
the person before the court would benefit, or at least not be harmed, by commitment. See
SCHEFF, supra note 25, at 147, 151. The unfortunate part of this justification is that theidea is erroneous. See the discussion on the consequences of commitment at text accom-
panying notes 331-49, infra. The court is more likely to see conflict of interest between
"responsible relatives" and "irresponsible patients," and thus less likely to order commitment
if both sides of the picture are presented. Szasz, Civil Liberties and the Mentally Ill,
9 CLEv.-MAR. L. REV. 399, 404 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Civil Liberties].
29422 U.S. 563 (1975).
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such persons involuntarily if they are dangerous to no one and can
live safely in freedom."
This statement suggests that a finding of mental illness in addition to some-
thing else may be sufficient justification for custodial confinement. The two
grounds most frequently advanced in defense of involuntary commitment
statutes are the exercise of the state police power to protect other members
of the community from harm and the use of the state's parens patriae authority
to shield the individual from possible harm to himself."'
Judged in these terms, the prior statutory definition"2 may have been
able to survive constitutional attack. The likelihood of the person causing
injury to others if allowed to remain at liberty was considered sufficient
justification for use of the police power, and the likelihood of injury to
himself, or his inability to seek needed treatment, was seen as a proper object
of the parens patriae authority.3" Both theories, however, have been subject
to virulent attack, and the new legislation may well represent an attempt to
lessen such criticisms.
One of the most vocal critics has been psychiatrist Thomas Szasz, who
believes that involuntary confinement for mental illness is never justified.
Szasz believes that petitions for involuntary commitment are usually instigated
when the mentally ill person has failed to fulfill family obligations. For
example, when a woman is suffering from serious postpartum depression
and consequently neglects her household duties, it is her husband who is
faced with the dilemma of a disintegrating household and an incoherent wife
and who calls in a physician. Ostensibly, he is requesting help for his wife,
but it is actually the husband who perceives the need for help in remedying
30 Id. at 575.
31 For a full discussion of both grounds, see Civil Commitment, supra note 19, at 1207-40.
32 See note 9, supra, for the text of the statute. The Florida statute which permits commit-
ment when a mentally ill person has been found "in need of care or treatment and lacking
sufficient capacity to make a responsible application on his own behalf" was recently held
precise enough to withstand a constitutional attack on vagueness grounds. In re Beverly,
342 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1977).
33 Society is entitled to protect itself against predatory acts on the part of anti-social
people, regardless of the cause of their anti-social actions. Therefore, if the State can
prove that an individual is likely to injure others if left at liberty, it may hospitalize
him. The State is also entitled to prevent a person from injuring himself in the very
specific sense of doing physical damage to himself, either actively or passively. There-
fore, when it can be demonstrated that an individual has a self-destructive urge and
will be violent towards himself, or alternatively that he is so . . . mentally ill that by
sheer inactivity he will permit himself to die either of starvation or lack of care, then
the State is entitled to hospitalize him.
State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, 202 S.E.2d 109, 123 (W. Va. 1974).
s, Civil Liberties, supra note 28, at 413. Szasz points out that when a person has failed to
fulfill obligations outside of the home, other sanctions are available. If a person fails to
perform on his job, chances are high that he will be fired; if he fails to perform a legal
duty, such as paying taxes, he will be prosecuted.
[Vol. 11: 1
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his situation. 5 Since he is the one who wants to change the situation, he
should take action on his own behalf, that is, to sever the relationship with
his failing partner. 8
Szasz explains that involuntary commitment for the wife cannot be
justified by the state's police power. Although she is not living up to society's
expectation of fulfilling her role as "wife," she has violated no legal rule.
Any rules that she has broken fall into the realm of social customs or mores,
and these types of violations are usually penalized outside of the legal system,
by social ostracism, loss of employment or alienation of a spouse." To say
that she might, someday, perform a criminal act is insufficient justification
for commitment. A democratic government must take some chances with
respect to what its citizens might do; some safety and security must be sacri-
ficed in the name of personal liberty and dignity." This argument is
strengthened by the fact that it is difficult to justify such preventive detention
on an empirical basis. 9 The presence of mental illness has not proven to
be an accurate predictor of dangerous behavior,"0 and studies have generally
shown that those classified as mentally ill are not as a group more dangerous
than others.4"
While Szasz does not favor involuntary commitment under the police
power doctrine, neither does he favor involuntary commitment under the
parens patriae doctrine. Szasz argues that treatment imposed ostensibly for
the patient's benefit is too readily converted into a means of social control
85 Id. at 401.
36 To simply detach oneself from the annoying person is not so easy in a family situation,
for one is likely to have guilt feelings when abandoning a relative. Some people find it
easier to have the troublesome family member committed to a mental institution-or even to
kill him-than to leave him. Id. at 414 n.23.
37 Id. at 407.
8 Id. at 411.
30 See Dershowitz, The Law of Dangerousness: Some Fictions About Predictions, 23 J. LEGAL
EDuc. 24, 33 (1970); Hardisty, supra note 19, at 761; Shah, Dangerousness and Civil Com-
mitment of the Mentally Ill: Some Public Policy Considerations, 132 AM. J. PSYCH. 501,
502 (1975).
40 See Dershowitz, supra note 39, at 33 (mental illness "not an accurate predictor of danger-
ous conduct"); Livermore, supra note 19, at 83 (although mental illness is not very useful
in determining potentially dangerous individuals, the probability of dangerous conduct would
increase if only those mentally ill individuals who had previously engaged in dangerous be-
havior were used in the computations). Yet in spite of this low reliability, approximately
50,000 mentally ill persons are committed on the ground of dangerousness every year. Rubin,
Prediction of Dangerousness in Mentally Ill Criminals, 27 ARcHIvEs GEN. PSYCH. 397, 400
(1972).
41 See In re Ballay, 482 F.2d at 666 (little reason to suspect that persons classified as
"mentally ill" tend to be more dangerous to society than others); Albers, Pasework & Mayer,
Involuntary Hospitalization and Psychiatric Testimony: The Fallibility of the Doctrine of
Immaculate Perception, 6 CAP. U. L. REv. 11, 24 (1976) (citing studies which support "the
view that persons labelled 'mentally ill' are not necessarily more dangerous than persons
within the general population"); Rubin, supra note 40, at 400.
Summer, 1977]
8
Akron Law Review, Vol. 11 [1978], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol11/iss1/4
AKRON LAW REviEw
and that instead of forcing psychiatric treatment on unwilling patients, the
state should create "economic, moral, and political circumstances favorable
to a plentiful supply of competent physicians and effective drugs" 2 so that
each person is able to pursue and obtain adequate medical care if he so
desires. Such a desire may spring from a realization that his personal rela-
tionships are not as satisfactory as they might be, or it may be a result of
a fear of loss of employment or possible criminal prosecution. The goal
would be to make medical intervention in the area of mental illness similar
to that involving physical illness; the individual would have access to treat-
ment but would not be compelled to accept it."3
At least one court has seen fit to limit the state's parens patriae authority
in the mental health field. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
struck down a statute," similar to Ohio's, that permitted commitment on
the basis of a finding that the person involved was mentally ill, but unable
to make his own decisions in regard to treatment. The court stated that the
standard was so subjective that opportunities for abuse were created and the
committing authority's determination could not be challenged in a meaning-
ful appeal."5 The court noted that consideration for the person's health could
not override the foregoing due process concerns, because "[s]ociety abounds
with persons who should be hospitalized, either for gall bladder surgery,
back operations, corrective orthopedic surgery, or other reasons; yet in these
areas society would not contemplate involuntary hospitalization for treat-
ment." 8 The court found mere general concerns about the person's welfare
insufficient to overrule his capacity for self-determination since "[m]odern
welfare programs, community mental health facilities and private social
service agencies have eliminated the problems of actual starvation and per-
secution of the mentally disturbed.""
42 Szasz, The Right to Health, 57 GEo. L.J. 734, 751 (1969).
43 Id. at 744. Szasz points out that many mental patients are tricked into entering the hos-
pital. Civil Liberties, supra note 28, at 410. That this is at least sometimes true was illus-
trated in Geddes v. Daughters of Charity of St. Vincent de Paul, Inc., 348 F.2d 144 (5th
Cir. 1965). In that case, the brother of a 59 year-old woman gave her the impression that
she was going to the hospital to receive medical treatment for abdominal adhesions that had
resulted from a ruptured appendix many years ago. She admitted herself voluntarily with
this idea in mind, but discovered later that she was in a mental hospital for the purpose
of receiving psychiatric treatment.
4 W. VA. CODE § 27-5-4 (2) (1971) (repealed 1975) permitted involuntary hospitalization
if the individual "[i]s in need of custody, care or treatment in a hospital and because of hisillness or retardation lacks sufficient insight or capacity to make responsible decisions with
respect to his hospitalization."
45 State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, 202 S.E.2d 109, 123 (W. Va. 1974).But see In re Beverly,
342 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1977), discussed in note 32, supra.
48 202 S.E.2d at 123.
47 Id. For a historical description of society's treatment of the mentally ill, see Lessard v.
Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1084-86 (E.D. Wis. 1972). In the early American colonies
mental illness was equated with moral turpitude, and indigent incompetents were often ex-
pelled from the towns and left to wander about the countryside. Id. at 1086.
[Vol. 11: 1
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Although these arguments against involuntary commitment are very
forceful, a few problems will remain. For example, if freedom of choice is
at issue, the person who is so ill that he is unable to make a responsible
decision concerning his own welfare must be considered. When unconscious
forces have overwhelmed any conscious choice, it is ludicrous to speak of
freedom of choice. 8 For instance, to leave a catatonic schizophrenic to his
own fate is to deny him any choice at all; 9 it is comparable to leaving a
person who is brought to the hospital in a diabetic coma untreated because
he does not voluntarily assent to treatment.50 Limited treatment could thus
be justified on the ground that it will give the person greater intrapsychic
freedom to make a meaningful choice as to what treatment, if any, he wishes
to pursue.5
Problems also arise when the behavior of the mentally ill person
seriously endangers his own or others' safety, either actively or passively.
Though married persons can relieve themselves by seeking divorce, other
relationships cannot be dissolved as easily. For example, a person cannot
divorce his elderly parent who makes life intolerable for the people around
him. Even if the parent is told to live elsewhere, the problem does not dis-
appear because other people are going to find the anti-social behavior equally
objectionable. Unfortunately, our society has not yet made humane provisions
for the unwanted who are unable to care for themselves.
A problem also exists where the person who has previously engaged
in violent behavior is very likely to do so again. To ignore him is to put
innocent bystanders in jeopardy. It appears that when this threat of harm
exceeds the potential harm caused by involuntary commitment, confinement
is justified.52
Perhaps because these problems are not easily resolved, Ohio's new
Mental Health Act has taken a middle ground. While involuntary commitment
has not been abolished, the new statute attempts to delineate more clearly
the criteria for its use. After a finding of mental illness has been made, the
statute permits hospitalization by court order in the following four circum-
stances.
48 Katz, The Right to Treatment-An Enchanting Legal Fiction?, 36 U. Cm. L. REV. 755,
770 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Katz].
49 Id. at 771.
50 Even Szasz has agreed that extreme cases such as this should be treated without the
patient's consent. But once the diabetic or schizophrenic, whichever the case may be, has
regained consciousness, Szasz would say that consent is required for any further treatment.
Even if treatment is then incomplete, a conscious patient has the right to leave the hospital
whenever he pleases. Civil Liberties, supra note 28, at 408.
51 Katz, supra note 48, at 771.
52 Civil Commitment, supra note 19, at 1236. The quantum of "dangerousness" to be weighed
against harm to the individual can be defined as "the product of the magnitude of the harm
he is predicted to cause and the probability that he will cause it." Id.
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(1) The mentally ill person "represents a substantial risk of physical
harm to himself as manifested by evidence of threats of, or attempts at,
suicide or self-inflicted bodily harm." 3 The state is still asserting an interest
in the protection of its citizens, even from themselves, but the basis of inter-
vention is more limited than it was under the prior statute in at least three
respects. First, the injury must be physical; intervention on the basis of
mismanagement of social relations, for example, is no longer justified.
Second, the necessity of some concrete evidence means that allegations and
proof must be clearly focused, thus enabling the allegedly mentally ill person
to present some sort of rebuttal.5" Third, the fact that there must be evidence
of past destructive behavior provides less room for speculation about future
possibilities.
(2) The mentally ill person "represents a substantial risk of physical
harm to others as manifested by evidence of recent homicidal or other
violent behavior or evidence of recent threats that place another in reasonable
fear of violent behavior and serious physical harm."5 Again, the harm
contemplated must be physical rather than social or psychological, and fear
of the harm must be evidenced by specific past behavior, which greatly
enhances the reliability of any predictions of dangerousness."8
(3) The mentally ill person "represents a substantial and immediate
risk of serious physical impairment or injury to himself as manifested by
evidence that he is unable to provide for and is not providing for his basic
physical needs because of his mental illness and.., appropriate provision
for such needs cannot be made immediately available in the community." 7
The state is again concerned with protection of the individual from himself,
53 OHIo REv. CODiE ANN. § 5122.05 (C) (1) (Page Supp. 1976).
54 One of Szasz's main criticisms of the commitment procedure has been the lack of precise
"charges" against the respondent. In contrasting commitment with criminal procedure he
points out that:
Once the psychiatrist has made a "diagnosis," the patient is considered "sick." The
psychiatrist does not have to prove his allegation (in court or outside of it). But the
patiant :must now prove, as it were, that he is "not sick." And how can he do this,
especially when he is ignorant of the criteria used to establish that he was "sick" in
the first place?
Civil Liberties, supra note 28, at407-08 (emphasis in original).
55 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.01 (B) (2) (Page Supp. 1976).
56 Livermore, supra note 19, at 83. Preventive detention has been judicially recognized as
acceptable in such a case.
Although attempts to predict future conduct are always difficult, and confinement
based upon a prediction of dangerousness must always be viewed with suspicion, civil
commitment can be justified in some cases if the proper burden of proof is satisfied
and dangerousness is based upon a finding of a recent overt act, attempt or threat to
do substantial harm to oneself or another.
Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1093 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on procedural
grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), on remand 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated
on procedural grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), on remand 413 F. Supp. (E.D. Wis. 1976).
57 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5122.01 (B) (3) (Page Supp. 1976).
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but the harm contemplated is not violent self-harm. This section permits
commitment in cases where only custodial care is contemplated or possible,
the senile elderly parent being the most obvious candidate for involuntary
hospitalization. Concrete evidence of past behavior must be available which
would point to the inability of the person to care for himself and the inade-
quacy of care elsewhere in the community must be shown. This is in accord
with the "least restrictive alternative" concept which is also part of the
new Act.5 8
(4) The mentally ill person "would benefit from treatment in a hos-
pital for his mental illness and is in need of such treatment as manifested by
evidence of behavior that creates a grave and imminent risk to substantial
rights of others or himself."59 This is the least precise section of the new
statute. Here no prediction of future physical harm to the individual or
anyone else is required; instead, the statute refers to the need of and benefit
from treatment and to the "risk of substantial rights," which terms are not
defined. Presumably this section would cover the situation in which the
individual is in a state of mind which renders him unable to make any
meaningful decisions regarding his own welfare. Such a situation is not
directly covered by the other statutory criteria.6" Presently, however, this
section is open to interpretation and may be construed to cover the deterio-
rating social relations that were part of the definition of mental illness under
the prior statute.6 "Substantial rights" might be extended to include the
right of a husband to be free from excessive expenditures made by his wife,
the right of a wife to have her husband support the household instead of
spending his paycheck elsewhere, and the right of children to be free from
mental distress from an abusive and insulting parent. Thus, the scope of
this section will remain in doubt until it has been interpreted by the courts.
Concern about the vagueness of this section, however, may be lessened
by certain built-in constraints. For example, the person urging commitment
must show a need for treatment as manifested by concrete evidence of past
behavior and must also show that the "sick" person would benefit from
58 See text accompanying notes 409-13 infra.
59 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.01 (B) (4) (Page Supp. 1976).
6 0 Under the old law, such a stiuation would have been covered under § 5122.01 (B)
(Page 1970), which provided for involuntary hospitalization in the case where a person
was found to need treatment but lacked capacity to make responsible decisions regarding
hospitalization. See note 9 supra. If this section of the statute would be held not to dispose
of this situation, it may be possible to accomplish the same result by applying for appoint-
ment of a guardian and having the person admitted to the hospital by the guardian under
the section governing voluntary hospitalization. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.02 (B)
(Page Supp. 1976). In some cases it may also be possible to argue that the person is unable
to take care of his physical needs because of his mental illness and so is covered by the
third criterion. See id. § 5122.01 (B) (3).
61 See note 9 supra, for the text of the old statute.
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treatment. Thus, the mentally ill person at least is made aware of the accusa-
tions against him and has the opportunity to present contrary evidence. 2
Additional protection is provided in that the person has a right to a judicial
hearing, with counsel,"3 and all elements of the case must be shown by
clear and convincing evidence."4
One should observe that all four criteria meet the Donaldson standard
of constitutionality, i.e., in no case is a person kept in indefinite custodial
confinement upon a bare finding of "mental illness." The first three criteria
are justified on the ground that the mentally ill person is likely to cause
physical harm to himself or others;" the rationale of the fourth criterion is
that the mentally ill person will benefit from treatment. 6
62 Both results are important to the person accused of mental illness. See notes 33 and 59
supra.
63 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5122.15 (C) (Page Supp. 1976). One court has required proof
beyond a reasonable doubt because of the significant deprivation of liberty that results from
commitment. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. at 1095. If that standard of proof were re-
quired, the process of commitment would be significantly more difficult. See Civil Commit-
ment, supra note 19 at 1296-1300. However, such a standard would not be totally im-
practicable. Id. at 1301-03.
64 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5122.15 (C) (Page Supp. 1976).
65 These grounds for involuntary commitment have been legally accepted elsewhere. See
note 33 supra.
66 The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia upheld a similar statutory provision,
but in a conclusory fashion:
The State would also be permitted, under the Constitution, to hospitalize a person
who suffers from a mental illness or retardation which is likely to produce some form
of injury other than direct physical injury, if the type of injury were definitely ascertain-
able, and if the State had a treatment program which it could be demonstrated offered
a reasonable likelihood of ameliorating the illness or condition.
State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, 202 S.E.2d at 123-24. However, problems could arise if the
patient refused treatment, not an unlikely situation when he has been involuntarily com-
mitted. Then he would be kept in simple custodial confinement, which would seem to be
constitutionally prohibited under Donaldson. See text accompanying note 30 supra. Alterna-
tively, if the person were treated in spite of the fact that he did not wish to be, other
problems arise. Absent an emergency, such unauthorized treatment would constitute a tort
in any other context. See, e.g., Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1976); Parker v.
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 335 So. 2d 725 (La. App. 1976); Sard v. Hardy, 367
A.2d 525 (Md. App. 1976); Gray v. Grunnagle, 423 Pa. 144, 155, 223 A.2d 663, 668-69(1966); Small v. Gifford Memorial Hosp., 133 Vt. 552, 349 A.2d 703 (1975). When the
state participates in such conduct, it could constitute a violation of the eighth amendment,
Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939, 946 (3d Cir. 1976); Souder v. McGuire, 423 F. Supp. 830(M.D. Pa. 1976) (memorandum opinion denying defendant's motion to dismiss); the first
amendment, Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d at 946; the Equal Protection Clause of the four-
teenth amendment (the classification of those persons subject to compulsory treatment is
under-inclusive in that it does not include those persons suffering from physical illnesses);
or the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment (forcing an ill person to submit
to treatment infringes on the fundamental liberties guaranteed to every citizen in a free
state). The natural law arguments behind a substantive due process claim become even
stronger when looked at in light of the Ohio Constitution, which begins by stating, "All men
are, by nature, free and independent, and have certain inalienable rights, among which are
those of enjoying and defending life . . . and seeking and obtaining happiness and safety."
OHIO CONST. art. I §1.
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II. PROCEDURE
A. Hearings Required for Involuntary Commitment
Under the new Mental Health Act, Ohio's procedures relating to judicial
hospitalization are an attempt to comply with those minimal due process
standards suggested by the Ohio Supreme Court in In re Fisher. The pro-
ceedings are still commenced by the filing of an affidavit by "any person
or persons"6 with the appropriate court, however, much has been added
by the legislature in an effort to curtail abusive use of this process. The
judge or referee reviewing the affidavit must make an initial ex parte
determination as to whether probable cause exists to believe that the individual
is subject to detention prior to a full hearing on the merits.68 Provision is
also made for investigation by the court of the allegations contained in the
affidavit6" and medical examination of the individual sought to be hospital-
ized to consider whether care and treatment are necessary."0
Newly enacted is a provision for a probable cause hearing, if requested,
which unlike the ex parte determination upon receipt of the affidavit, affords
all the attributes of an adversary hearing.' Hence the new Act provides
the individual sought to be committed with two opportunities to test the
allegations of the affidavit. The last step in the commitment procedure is
the full hearing, expanded to provide a full range of procedural safeguards."'
Moreover, after judicial commitment, the new Act provides that mandatory
hearings be held at specified intervals to consider the necessity of continued
commitment, 3 and with respect to all hearings, the court is under an affirma-
tive duty to provide adequate notice to the individual sought to be hospital-
ized.7"
1. Initial Filing
In order to obtain a court order to hospitalize a person who is allegedly
mentally ill, one must file an affidavit with the probate division of the court
of common pleas.7 "Any person or persons" having "reliable information
or actual knowledge" of "facts sufficient to indicate probable cause to be-
lieve that the person [sought to be hospitalized] is a mentally ill person
67 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.11 (Page Supp. 1976).
68 Id.
69Id. § 5122.13.
70Id. § 5122.14.
71Id. § 5122.141.
72 Id. § 5122.15.
73 Id.
74Id. § 5122.12.
75Id. § 5122.11. All references to "court" in the Act mean "the probate division of- the
court of common pleas." Id. § 5122.01 (Q).
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Person voluntarily ad-
mitted, but request
for release resisted.
§5122.03 (B).
HEARINGS
Emergency
Detention.
§5122.10.
Judicially ordered
hospitalization.
§5122.11.
Affidavit alleging person is a mentally ill person subject to
hospitalization by court order. §5122.11.
1. Notice to interested parties. §5122.12.
2. Investigation. §5122.13.
3. Medical and psychological examination. §5122.14.
4. Ex parte probable cause hearing. § 5122.11.
No finding of probable
cause - dismissal.
Finding of probable
cause.I
Matter set for further hearin detention order.
Adversarial probable cause
hearing, if requested. §5122.141.
Dismissal. Probable cause found - court mayissue interim order of detention.
Mandatory full hearing to determine whether respon-
Dismissal ...'.".' dent is a mentally ill person subject to hospitalization
by court order. § 5122.15.
!
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Finding by clear and convincing
evidence that person is a mentally
ill person subject to hospitalization
by court order.
Discharge by court.
Release or placement in a
less restrictive environment.
§5122.15(F).
Commitment for 90 days.
Voluntary
admission.
§ 5122.15 (G).
Discharge, unless application
for continued commitment
filed. §5122.15(H).
i...........
Mandatory hearing on application
for continued commitment.
§5122.15 (H).
'=I- I:l I I 1 111 I I [III I I[Iltl l ll l tl l III III I I IitI :ItIII I I1 11 II .II I I
D~isissal. Discharge Additional 90-yby court. commitment.
uIt IIIIll uIIllll il IIll Ill I ll g l lllulllllIIIII  i III  i I III I lI lll I II [ [ III
Discharge, unless application for
continued commitment filed.
§5122.15(H).
Hearing on application for
continued commitment, unless
waived.* §5122.15(H).
IIuhhuI I~II,Im1111 11 11111111111 I IIIIIIh iII hIII IhI 11 1 IIIIIIIIIhIh111 IIIIhE111111111IIIIII  I11---111--1
Disia Discharge Additional 90-dayby court. commitment.I
Mandatory hearing held every two
years following the first 90-day
commitment. §5122.15(H).
*Under the proposed amendments this hearing would not be held unless requested.
- . !!!!!! 111!111! um ! !!!!!! ! !I iIIIII .......... all
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subject to hospitalization by court order" can file such an affidavit."8 Pre-
viously the law required only that there exist "reason to believe that the
individual . . . is likely to injure himself or others if allowed to remain at
liberty, or needs immediate hospital treatment."77
Prior law had permitted the affidavit to be based merely on "informa-
tion or actual knowledge," 8 which had the effect of allowing hearsay to
support the affidavit, a practice which the Ohio Supreme Court has dis-
approved. 9 Although the new requirements do not act as an absolute bar
fo the use of hearsay in the affidavit, insofar as the information must have
some indicia of reliability, one may presume that only hearsay which would
qualify for admission under the rules of evidence should be acceptable in
the affidavit.8 0
Upon receipt of the affidavit, the court may further require either a
certificate from a psychiatrist8 stating that he has examined the individual
sought to be hospitalized and is of the opinion that the individual is mentally
ill and ought to be subject to hospitalization by court order, or may require
signed certificates of both a licensed clinical psychologist and a licensed
physician" stating conclusions to the same effect.8 Prior law did not require
certification, but accepted the statement of a licensed physician that he had
examined the individual and was of the opinion that the individual was
"mentally ill and should be hospitalized."85 In lieu of either of these classes
of certification, the applicant may be required to submit a written' statement
under oath that the person sought to be hospitalized has refused to consent
to an examination.8
In addition, the court or an attorney appointed by the court to act
6 1d. § 5122.11.
7T ORio REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.11 (Page 1970) (amended 1976).
7 Id.
7 In re Fisher, 39 Ohio St. 2d 71, 79-80, 313 N.E.2d 851, 857 (1974) ("many petitionsfor commitment are based upon hearsay evidence and subject to the same abuses in civil
commitment hearings which render such evidence inadmissible in any other civil or criminalproceeding"). See also Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 394 (M.D. Ala. 1974) ("At the
very least, due process requires that the rules of evidence applicable to other judicial pro-
ceedings be followed in involuntary commitment proceedings . . .. In particular, if hearsay
evridence would be excluded from other proceedings, it should be excluded from commitment
hearings as well").
86 A further effort to restrict the type of evidence acceptable in commitment procedures
is found in Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.15 (A) (9) (Page Supp. 1976) where the court
or appointed referee is constrained to accept only "reliable, competent, and material evidence."
1 As defined at Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.01 (E) (Page Supp. 1976).
82 d. § 5122.01 (I).
8i Id. § 5122.01 (D).
84 1 d. § 5122.11.
85 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.11 (Page 1970) (amended 1976).
86 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.11 (Page Supp. 1976).
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as referee must make an initial ex parte determination of whether there is
probable cause to believe that the "person named in the affidavit is a mentally
ill person subject to hospitalization by court order.""7 Upon such a determina-
tion, the court or referee may issue a temporary order of detention which
empowers any health or police officer or sheriff to take the individual into
custody and transport him to a hospital or other facility approved by the
statute.8" Thus, the Act still provides for issuance of an ex parte order of
detention, a practice which had been the subject of criticism. 9 However,
the statute does indicate that wherever possible, the probable cause hearing
should be held prior to taking custody of the respondent. 0 If this is im-
possible and the individual is first taken into custody, he may be treated
and observed until a probable cause hearing is held, and if such a hearing
is not held, until the full hearing is conducted.9
2. Notice of Hearings
After filing the affidavit, written notice of any judicial hearing, e.g.,
the probable cause hearing or the mandatory full hearing, must be sent to a
number of persons specifically designated by the statute.92 Among these
persons are the respondent,"3 the affiant, respondent's counsel, or any other
person that the respondent may designate.9" Absent from the new law is the
former provision which allowed the court to dispense with notice to the
individual sought to be hospitalized where notice would be "injurious to
the individual." 5 Apparently in response to several recent cases criticizing
this practice,98 the new Act declares that notice to the individual sought
to be committed may not be waived.9 In addition, "[a] copy of the affidavit
87 Id.
88 Id. The other facilities are described at Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5122.17 (Page Supp.
1976) and include the individuals "home, a licensed rest or nursing home, a licensed or.
unlicensed hospital, a mental health clinical facility, or a county home .... " Jails are
excluded "unless the court finds that a less restrictive alternative cannot be made available."
In no event may the individual be detained for more than forty-eight hours in any of these
facilities pending removal to a hospital.
89 See, e.g., Dewey, Imprisonment of the Mentally Ill: An Inquiry Into the Deprivation of
Civil Liberties Under Ohio Laws and Procedures, 1 CAP. L. REv. 1, 11-14 (1972).
90 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5122.141 (Page Supp. 1976).
91Id. § 5122.11. If no probable cause hearing is held, observation and treatment are per-
mitted until the full hearing provided for in § 5122.15.
92 Id. § 5122.12.
93 Respondent, as used throughout the Act "means the person whose detention, commitment,
hospitalization, or continued hospitalization or discharge is being sought in any proceeding
under this chapter." Id. § 5122.01 (N).
94 1d. § 5122.12.
95 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5122.12 (Page 1970).
96E.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1090 (1972); In re Fisher, 39 Ohio St.
2d 71, 79, 313 N.E.2d 851, 857 (1974).
0 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5122.12 (F) (Page Supp. 1976).
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and temporary order of detention [if issued] shall be served with such
notice to the parties and to respondent's counsel, if counsel has been ap-
pointed or retained."9
3. Investigation
Upon receipt of the affidavit, the court must order an investigation
concerning the allegations contained in the affidavit99 and any "other infor-
mation relating to whether or not the person named in the affidavit or
statement is a mentally ill person subject to hospitalization by court order."1 '
The investigation must be conducted by a social worker or other investigator
as the court may appoint.1"' Prior to the full hearing, the individual's
counsel, if known, must be sent a copy of the report of this investigation,
and the person conducting the investigation must submit a written report
to the court which will become a part of the official court record."0 2 Insofar
as the probable cause hearing is conducted in accordance with the same
procedures as the full hearing," 3 including the requirement that with the
consent of the respondent all relevant documents, information, and evidence
in the custody or control of the state shall be made available to counsel for
the respondent,' one could argue that this investigative report should be
made available to counsel prior to the probable cause hearing as well. Con-
sidering the adversary nature of the probable cause hearing, such a report
could be very helpful in the preparation of an adequate defense of the allega-
tions.
4. Pre-hearing Medical Examination
In the event the court requires certification of examination by a psychia-
trist, or by a psychologist and physician to accompany the affidavit, the court
may order an examination of the individual sought to be hospitalized; if no
certificate has been submitted, the court must order an examination. 105 The ex-
98Id.
99 Id. § 5122.13. It should be noted that this section is currently being reconsidered in
H.B. 725, 112th General Assembly (1977-78) which is currently in committee. Under the
new proposals, the investigation would be discretionary rather than mandatory. The scope
of the investigation is broadened to include an inquiry into the availability of appropriate
treatment alternatives. Additionally, the investigative report will not be admissible as evidence
on the question of whether a person is mentally ill and subject to court ordered hospitaliza-
tion, but it shall be used to aid the court in selecting an appropriate placement for such
an individual.
100 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.13 (Page Supp. 1976).
101 Id.
102 d.
103 Section 5122.141 provides in part that the "probable cause hearing shall be conducted in
a manner consistent with the procedures set forth in divisions (A) (1) to (15) of section
5122.15" relating to the full hearing.
104 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.15 (A) (1) (a) (Page Supp. 1976).
105 Id. § 5122.14.
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amination is to be carried out, if possible, in a place least likely to have a harm-
ful effect on the respondent's health, and the individual's home is specifically
suggested. 106 At the first hearing, the examiner shall report to the court his
findings as to the mental condition of the respondent, and his need for
custody, care, or treatment in a mental hospital. 107 Prior to the full hearing,
a copy of this report must be sent to the individual's counsel, if known,10
and it also should be noted that at the probable cause hearing and the full
hearing, the individual sought to be hospitalized must be informed that he
may have independent expert evaluation, if necessary, at state expense."' 9
5. Probable Cause Hearing
The new Act provides for two possible occasions when a probable
cause determination must be made on the question of whether an individual
sought to be judicially committed to a mental health facility is indeed a
mentally ill individual subject to court ordered hospitalization. First, an
ex parte determination must be made by the court or referee upon receipt
of the affidavit."0 Second, the court must make the same determination
after an adversary proceeding if the provisions of Ohio Revised Code
§ 5122.141 requiring a probable cause hearing are invoked.
This process may prove to be administratively cumbersome; however,
from the point of view of the individual involved in the judicial hospitaliza-
tion procedure, it affords an extra measure of protection against unjustified
commitment. To illustrate this, one need only juxtapose similar procedures
of the old and new acts. The earlier provision allowed the court to issue a
temporary detention order upon receipt of the affidavit where there was
reason to believe that the individual needed treatment or was likely to
injure himself or others if allowed to remain at large.11' Thereafter, the
individual was granted a hearing, but the court could order the individual
involuntarily hospitalized for a period of ninety days, solely upon the court's
finding that there was probable cause to believe that the individual was
mentally ill and needed treatment."' In contrast, the present Act provides
that the referee still may issue a temporary order of detention based on the
affidavit, but only upon a probable cause determination that the person
is a mentally ill individual subject to hospitalization by court order, 2' a
106 Id.
1OT Id.
108 Id.
109Id. §§ 5122.141 and 5122.15 (A) (4).
10 See notes 68 and 76 and accompanying text supra.
11 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.11 (Page 1970) (amended 1976).
112 d. § 5122.15.
213 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5122.11 (Page Supp. 1976). See text accompanying notes 53-58
supra.
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highly particularized definition of precisely who is subject to involuntary
commitment. After this determination the individual is afforded another
opportunity to test the allegations of the affidavit at a probable cause hearing.
Again, this may result in involuntary detention, but generally only for such
time as would be necessary to arrange a full hearing on the same question,
and in no event later than forty-five days after the original involuntary
detention." '
However, one should note that the probable cause hearing is not a
necessary consequence of the judicial hospitalization procedure. Unless the
court orders such a hearing on its own motion, it must be requested by an
individual who has already been detained involuntarily or against whom
judicial hospitalization proceedings have been initiated, or his guardian, his
counsel, or the head of the hospital.115 Because the probable cause hearing
must be conducted in accordance with the procedural rights of the full
hearing, it may be inconvenient for some of the parties to seek actively
such a hearing especially when one considers that the hearing must be held
within three court days from the request.'18 Provision is made for continu-
ance for good cause, but in no event may the probable cause hearing be held
later than ten days from the request, and failure to do so results in immediate
discharge of the individual and expungement of the record.11 Many cir-
cumstances could interfere with the initiation of a probable cause hearing.
The court may not meaningfully implement this right in light of a crowded
docket. Moreover, the head of the hospital may have the medical equivalent
of a crowded docket, and it is therefore reasonable to assume that at times
he will be less than eager to request another hearing. Where the guardian
is the person seeking hospitalization," 8 his interest is likely to lie with an
expeditious determination; clearly another hearing, from his point of view,
would be an unnecessary hurdle. Hence, it appears that the burden of
invoking this procedural tool will fall on the individual sought to be commit-
ted or his counsel.
This, in turn, assumes that the individual is given adequate notice of
the availability of the hearing. The Act requires that an individual who has
been involuntarily detained be apprised of this opportunity as soon as he
114 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.141 (Page Supp. 1976).
225 Id. Note also that a patient who voluntarily admits himself may request release and if
such release is not effected within three days, such request for release serves as a request
for a probable cause hearing. Id. § 5122.03 (B).
116 Id. § 5122.141.
11? Id.
118 Recall that proceedings leading to judicial hospitalization are commenced by the filing
of an affidavit by "any person". Id. § 5122.11.
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is taken into custody."' However, nowhere is it explicitly stated that an
individual who is named in an affidavit seeking judicial hospitalization, and
who is not taken into custody, must be given such notice. However, as
noted earlier, the court or referee must give written notice to the individual
of any hearing which the court directs, after receipt of the affidavit. 2 '
In order to avoid discriminating between those individuals who are presently
involuntarily detained and those who are named in the affidavit, yet pres-
ently not in custody, it would seem that this notice requirement should be
mandatory for apprising both classes of individuals of the availability of this
hearing.
By incorporating the procedures of a full hearing into the probable
cause hearing, 2' the legislature establishes that it too must be conducted
in a manner consistent with due process of law."' Because this requirement
introduces the procedures of both the probable cause and the full hearings,
it perhaps has more significance than the drafters intended. The due process
requirement is one which is continually subject to judicial interpretation,
and thus develops in accordance with contemporary social values. 2 ' By
requiring the courts to conduct these hearings in accordance with due process
standards, the mentally ill person is granted further protection of his sub-
stantive rights. Judges, in enforcing due process requirements, can go
beyond the standards of fairness set out in the statute. Moreover, adherence
to due process standards, which are constantly changing, provides the Act
with built-in flexibility.
Further protection of substantive rights is provided by the section which
mandates that the individual sought to be committed has a right to attend
the hearing."' Although this provision is an improvement on the prior section
which permitted the court to prevent the individual from attending the hear-
19 Id. § 5122.05 (C) (3).
120 See notes 92-98 and accompanying text supra.
121 This section is also subject to change if H.B. 725, now pending before the Ohio House
of Representatives, is enacted in its present form. That bill would eliminate the need to
apply the rules of Civil Procedure, which are presently mandated to the extent not incon-
sistent with the remainder of the mental health chapter. See note 137 infra. The present Act
limits evidence admissible at the probable cause hearing to that which is reliable, competent
and material. See note 135 infra. However, the proposed changes would allow certificates
and written reports prepared pursuant to § 5122.11, supra notes 81-86, and § 5122.14,
supra notes 105-07 to be accepted into evidence without direct testimony of the proponent,
who would be excused from testifying at the hearing. Hence, the respondent would also
lose the right he presently has to subpoena and cross-examine those witnesses. See note
126 infra.
122 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.15 (A) (Page Supp. 1976).
123 Consider in this regard the recent rise of the right to counsel, and the societal pressures
which required extension of this right to state criminal proceedings as illustrated in A. LEwis,
GDEON'S TRUMPET 102-17 (1967).
124 Qmo REv. CODE ANN. § 5122.15 (A) (2) (Page Supp. 1976).
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ing if it found that his presence would be injurious to him, 2 ' the new law
is deficient of any restriction on the administration of personality altering
drugs immediately preceding the hearings. This omission or oversight is
perhaps more significant when one considers that under the new law
"[t]he respondent has the right to testify and the respondent or his counsel
has the right to subpoena witnesses and documents and to examine and
cross-examine witnesses.""12 Allowing the individual to be present and to
participate actively in his own defense is a right seriously limited when the
individual is likely to be in a drugged state. The courts may interpret such
a practice as a deprivation of due process,'27 and if so, such judicial con-
demnation of these practices could supplant the need for statutory amend-
ment.
Perhaps the most significant procedural requirement of the probable
cause hearing is that "[t]he respondent shall be informed that he may
retain counsel... and, if unable to obtain an attorney, shall be represented
by court-appointed counsel . ... "I This is in apparent compliance with
the mandate of the Ohio Supreme Court which has held that the
right to be represented by counsel must be made available at the earliest
stage of the proceedings commensurate with the individual's need for
a timely preparation of a defense or advancement of an argument for
alternative modes of treatment, preferably upon the filing of an affidavit
in Probate Court under R.C. 5122.11.19
This holding entails more than just availability of counsel; it requires
counsel who is prepared to defend the individual. Seemingly in answer to
this, the legislature engrafts what might be deemed a requirement of effective
assistance of counsel, by mandating that he be provided (if the respondent
permits) with all relevant documents in the control of any of the parties
to the hearing.' 0 However, one cannot reasonably expect a court-appointed
125 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.15 (Page 1970) (amended 1976). A provision similar to
this was held unconstitutional in Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
126 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.15 (A) (11) (Page Supp. 1976).
127 See, e.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1092 (1972) for criticism of such
practices and Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 389 (M.D. Ala. 1974) holding that "Due
process is not accorded by a hearing in which the individual, though physically present,
has no meaningful opportunity to participate because of incapacity caused by excessive or
inappropriate medication."
128 OHuo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.15 (A) (4) (Page Supp. 1976). Section 5122.15 (A) (3)
provides that if the individual is not present at the hearing and has not validly waived his
right to counsel, the court must immediately appoint counsel. In such a case the court must
continue the case, presumably to provide counsel time to familiarize himself with the case.
'
2 9 In re Fisher, 39 Ohio St. 2d 71, 82, 313 N.E.2d 851, 852 (1974).
L30 OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 5122.15 (A) (1) (a)-(c) (Page Supp. 1976). Query however
whether most practicing attorneys would know how to utilize all this material to the benefit
of his client? In this regard, see Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment
of the Mentally Ill, 44 TExAs L. REv. 424 (1966) and Civil Commitment, supra note 19
at 1283-91.
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counsel to have fully ingested all this material if in fact he is not appointed
until the probable cause hearing. Hence, Ohio Revised Code § 5122.05
(C) (2) provides in part:
(C) Any person who is involuntarily detained in a hospital or is other-
wise in custody under this chapter shall, immediately upon being taken
into custody, be informed of and provided with a written statement
that he may:
(2) Retain counsel and . . . if he is unable to obtain an attorney, be
represented by court-appointed counsel ....
Thus, the individual should be apprised of this right, and ideally, exercise it,
as soon as his liberty is impaired.
But what would be the result if an individual has been named in an
affidavit seeking judicial hospitalization under Ohio Revised Code § 5122.11
where the court or referee has found probable cause to believe that the
individual is subject to hospitalization, yet does not issue a temporary deten-
tion order and merely sets the matter for further hearing? "' The individual
is not in custody and therefore the provision calling for written notice of the
right to counsel"' is not invoked. Yet, Ohio Revised Code § 5122.12138
requires that after receipt of the affidavit, notice of any hearing be sent to
respondent's counsel, if retained. If this section is to have any meaningful
application, it must envision counsel who has already been appointed, argu-
ably upon receipt of the affidavit, which would comport fully with the
suggestion of the Ohio Supreme Court in In re Fisher.
At the probable cause hearing the court is to examine the sufficiency
of all documents filed and inform the respondent, if present, and his counsel
of the nature and content of the documents and the reason for which he
is being detained, or for which his placement is being sought."' Further,
the court is directed to receive only reliable, competent, and material evi-
dence, " and the individual must be advised that he may not be compelled
to testify against himself.3 6
The Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure are to be followed at the probable
cause hearing insofar as they are consistent with the chapter,"' and a
complete transcript and record of the proceeding must be maintained and
provided to indigent respondents upon request, free of charge.S8B
'31 This procedure is fully analyzed at notes 75-91 and accompanying text supra.
'2 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.05 (C) (2) (Page Supp. 1976).
133 See text accompanying notes 92-98 supra.
'34 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.15 (A) (8) (Page Supp. 1976).
'
3 5 Id. § 5122.15 (A) (9).
13 6 d. § 5122.15 (A) (12).
13 7Id. § 5122.15 (A) (15).
13 8 Id. § 5122.15 (A) (14).
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In short, the new Act provides for a genuine adversary hearing on the
question of whether there is probable cause to believe that the individual
is mentally ill and therefore subject to judicial hospitalization. If after the
hearing, the court does not find probable cause to believe that the individual
is subject to hospitalization, he must be released immediately and all record
of the proceeding expunged. " ' On a finding of probable cause, the court
may issue an interim order of detention.' ° If the individual is the subject
of judicial hospitalization proceedings under Ohio Revised Code § 5122.11,
the court must order a full hearing on the same question.'' Counsel at that
time may request, and if so requested, the court shall schedule the hearing
within ten days of the probable cause hearing." 2 Unless discharged, it is
mandatory that a full hearing be held within thirty to forty-five days after
the original involuntary detention of any respondent who has had no prob-
able cause hearing, or who failed to request a full hearing under this section,
or whose full hearing was not held because a continuance was granted.""
6. Full Hearing and Mandatory Hearing on Continued Commitment
The procedures of the full hearing have been set out in the discussion
of the probable cause hearing."4 However, final disposition on the question
of whether an individual is a mentally ill person subject to judicial hospitali-
zation must be determined by clear and convincing evidence." ' Although
argument has been advanced that commitment of an individual should be
based on proof of mental illness beyond a reasonable doubt, the better view
seems to invoke a clear and convincing evidence standard.' In any event,
a clear and convincing standard affords much greater protection against
unjustified commitment than the probable cause standard, discussed in the
preceding section." 7
139 Id. § 5122.141.
140 Id. See note 88 and accompanying text supra.
141 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.141 (Page Supp. 1976).
142 Id.
143 Id. See § 5122.15 (A) (13) which provides that "On motion of the respondent or his
counsel for good cause shown or on the court's own motion the court may order a con-
tinuance of the hearing."
144 Id. § 5122.15 (A) (l)-(15). See text accompanying note 121 supra.
15 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.15 (C) (Page Supp. 1976). The prior section allowed
commitment for up to ninety days on a finding by the court that there was probable cause
to believe that the individual was mentally ill and needed treatment. Omo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 5122.15 (Page 1970) (amended 1976).
146 See, e.g., In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (1973) and Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078
(E.D. Wis. 1972), both holding that proof of mental illness such as would warrant civil com-
mitment must be beyond a reasonable doubt. But see Lynch v. Baxley 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D.
Ala. 1974), invoking a clear and convincing standard.
17 Supra, notes 112 and 145.
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This determination is to be made by the trier of fact,' 8 which term
generally refers to the court, when it makes determinations of fact, or a
jury. The prior statute stipulated that the commitment hearing was to be
conducted without a jury.' It might be argued that the intent of the
legislature was to allow for a trial by jury. Presently, no section explicitly
provides for notice to the individual that such a trial is available and such
ambiguity may require further clarification by the legislature. 5 '
Unless the trier of fact determines by clear and convincing evidence
that the individual is mentally ill and subject to judicially enforced hospitali-
zation, he must be released immediately.'51 Upon a finding of clear and
convincing evidence that the individual is mentally ill and subject to hos-
pitalization, the court may order the individual to be placed in a mental
health facility, any other suitable facility, or under a suitable person's care
for a period of up to ninety days." 2 That, however, is not the sole alternative
open to the court; it may in fact "order the respondent's discharge."'u This
provision perhaps symbolizes the essence of the entire Act, that is, that the
state, when dealing with a mentally ill individual, must seek out those treat-
ment alternatives that will be the least restrictive avenue which will restore
the individual to lucidity. The Act directs the courts and mental health
officials to explore these options, and goes so far as to suggest that the
environment of one's own home is an available alternative to commitment.
Consider in this regard the words of Justice Stewart in O'Connor v.
Donaldson:
There is still no constitutional basis for confining such persons involun-
tarily if they are dangerous to no one and can live safely in free-
dom . . . . [T]he mere presence of mental illness does not disqualify
a person from preferring his home to the comforts of an institution.'"
(Emphasis added)
However, provision is made for commitment of the individual; and
for those persons who are not discharged under this section, the Court may
order the respondent, for a period not to exceed ninety days, to:
(1) A hospital operated by the Department of Mental Health and
Mental Retardation;
148 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.15 (B)-(C) (Page Supp. 1976).
249 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5122.15 (Page 1970).
150 H.B. 725, 112th General Assembly (1977-78), currently in committee, deletes "trier
of fact" and substitutes "court", thus resolving the ambiguity, if enacted, in favor of a
trial without jury.
151 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.15 (B) (Page Supp. 1976).
152 Id. § 5122.15 (C) (1)-(6).
155 Id. § 5122.15 (C) (emphasis added).
154 O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975).
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(2) A private hospital;
(3) The veterans' administration or other agency of the United States
Government;
(4) A community mental health clinical facility;
(5) Receive private psychiatric or psychological care and treatment;
(6) Any other suitable facility or person consistent with the diagnosis,
prognosis, and treatment needs of the respondent.115
From this range of options the court must select the "least restrictive alterna-
tive available," consistent with the individual's diagnosis and treatment
goals. 156
If at any time during the ninety day commitment period the person or
institution in charge of the individual determines that the individual's treat-
ment needs could be met in "an available and appropriate less restrictive
environment," the individual must be released and referred to the court.
At this point, the court must either dismiss the case or order placement in a
less restrictive environment upon consideration of recommendations by the
hospital, facility, or person.""
During the ninety day commitment period, the individual may apply
for voluntary admission to the hospital, facility, or person to which he was
committed. 5 ' If the individual is accepted as a voluntary patient, the court
must dismiss the case upon written notification of the same." 9 Such applica-
tion may also be made at any time following the filing of the affidavit
initiating judicial hospitalization proceedings.' However, if after such volun-
tary admission the individual requests release, it would appear that the
entire judicial hospitalization procedure would have to be commenced anew.' 6 '
If the individual remains involuntarily detained at the end of the ninety
day period of commitment, he must be discharged unless an "application
for continued commitment" has been filed at least ten days prior to the
termination of that period.' If an application has been filed, a mandatory
hearing must be held upon expiration of the ninety day commitment period.
If the court finds clear and convincing evidence that the individual is a
15 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.15 (C) (Page Supp. 1976). This is essentially the same
as the prior section with the addition of the provision in subsection (6). See OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 5122.15 (A)-(E) (Page 1970). The addition broadens the scope of possible
treatment alternatives, consistent with the general philosohpy of the Act.
156 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.15 (E) (Page Supp. 1976).
57 Id. § 5122.15 (F) (1)-(3).
1A5Id. § 5122.15 (G).
159 Id.
16 0 Id.
161 See note 115 and accompanying text supra.
2 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.15 (H) (Page Supp. 1976).
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mentally ill individual subject to hospitalization by court order, it may
discharge him or continue commitment for a second ninety day period. "'
A hearing on continued commitment must be held in this manner at
the termination of each subsequent ninety day period, unless such hearings
are waived."' Further, there must be a mandatory hearing held every two
years after the termination of the first ninety day commitment period."'
If the individual has been committed to a hospital or a mental health
clinical facility by judicial order, he must be examined within twenty-four
hours after admission. 6 ' Based upon this examination, the head of the
hospital must certify that the individual is a mentally ill person subject to
hospitalization by court order.'67 If such certification is not made, the indi-
vidual must be discharged immediately. " 8 Also, the head of the hospital
retains broad powers to subsequently discharge any person who has been
found to be a mentally ill individual subject to court ordered hospitalization.
Unless the individual has been indicted or convicted of a crime, the head
of the hospital, after a determination that "the conditions justifying involun-
tary hospitalization no longer obtain" can grant a discharge without the
consent or authorization of any court.'69 If the court orders hospitalization,
such treatment must be the least restrictive alternative available commensurate
with the individual's need. Presumably if another alternative arises that is
less restrictive and still meets the individual's treatment needs, the head of
the hospital should exercise this prerogative under the above authority.
7. The Question of Waiver
It has been noted that various procedural aspects of the Act are manda-
tory and therefore non-waivable. " 6 A waiver has been defined as "an inten-
tional relinquishment of a known right."'' If one emphasizes the requirement
of intent and knowledge, it is readily apparent that a person laboring under
a mental disability may indeed be incapable of making such a waiver."'
Hence, the possibility of an invalid waiver of fundamental rights may be
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id. § 5122.19. Previously this section commanded that the examination be carried out
within five working days of admission. Ofio REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.19 (Page 1970).
167 Omio REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.19 (Page Supp. 1976).
168 Id.
169 Id. § 5122.21.
170 For example, notice of and presence at all hearings are deemed non-waivable.
171 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
172 See, e.g., Heryford v. Parker 396 F.2d 393, 396 (10th Cir. 1968) ("special problems
may arise with respect to the effective waiver of rights by minors and mentally deficient
persons").
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mitigated by a clear determination by the trial court, on the record, that
the individual has exercised the waiver knowingly and intelligently." 3 Also,
several cases have allowed counsel to exercise the right for the individual
who has been deemed incompetent.'74 However, it appears that this practice
should be permitted only where counsel is actually playing an adversarial
role and acting in the best interests of the patient.'75
8. Summary
It has been previously noted'76 that the Ohio Supreme Court in the
case of In re Fisher7 found a number of problems with the then-existing
mental health statutes. Although its finding of unconstitutionally was based
on that part of the statute concerning the lack of any guarantee of counsel
during the course of commitment proceedings, the court also disapproved
of the notice provisions, the failure to require the presence of the individual
sought to be committed at the hearings, the general absence of any formal-
ities in the commitment hearings, and the failure to explore less restrictive
treatment alternatives.
The new Mental Health Act appears to answer these criticisms; counsel
is mandated by the statute, 7 ' notice to the individual is no longer discretion-
ary,19 hearings are expanded under the new Act to provide for a probable
cause hearing, if requested, and a full hearing, both of which have extensive
procedural requirements which should, in theory, render the hearings adver-
sarial."' And finally, the Court is under an affirmative duty to seek out
less restrictive treatment modes.' 8' Beyond this, the Act narrows the available
procedures for involuntary detention,' and provides for periodic mandatory
hearings on continued commitment. 8
Hence, from a procedural point of view, it is clear that In re Fisher
provided the Ohio legislature with what it felt were minimum due process
73 This approach is suggested in Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp. 509, 517 (D. Neb.
1975) and Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 389 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
74 See Kendall v. True, 391 F. Supp. 413 (W.D. Ky. 1975); Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F.
Supp. 509 (D. Nev. 1975); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
75 See Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393, 396 (10th Cir. 1968) (questioning but not de-
ciding whether the "mother as natural guardian, having set in motion the commitment
machinery, represented such conflicting interest that she could not effectively waive the
son's right to counsel").
1 76 See text accompanying notes 3-4 supra.
177 39 Ohio St. 2d 71, 313 N.E.2d 851 (1974).
'
7 8 See notes 128-29 and 144 and accompanying text supra.
1
7 9 See notes 92-98 and accompanying text supra.
'
80 See notes 110-61 and accompanying text supra.
181 See note 156 and accompanying text supra.
182 See notes 222-23 and accompanying text infra.
188 See notes 162-65 supra.
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guarantees. The legislature appears to have incorporated these into the new
Act, however it is also apparent that some innovative features which go far
beyond the dictates of In re Fisher have been added, making the present
Ohio procedural scheme perhaps the most progressive of its type extant.
B. Non-judicial Hospitalization
The standards for commitment under the voluntary and involuntary
admission procedures of Ohio's civil commitment act have been revised to
provide more effective due process protections. Designated individuals may
now request a court determination as to whether hospitalization is in the
best interest of one who has been "voluntarily" committed by a parent or
guardian. A person involuntarily committed is to be informed of his right
to retain counsel and, if unable to obtain such, to be represented by court
appointed counsel and to have a probable cause hearing upon request to
determine whether he falls within the commitment criteria necessary for
judicial hospitalization. In addition, definite time limits have been imposed
for which a person may be hospitalized subsequent to a request for release
and prior to a probable cause hearing.
C. Voluntary Hospitalization
1. Admission of Voluntary Patients
Ohio's Mental Health Act, as amended, continues to distinguish be-
tween a truly voluntary patient"' who is 18 years of age or older and applies
for his own hospitalization, and the voluntary patient who is either under
18 years of age or an adult incompetent185 for whom voluntary admission
has been requested by the parent or guardian. 8 ' Any person 18 years of
age or over who is, appears to be, or believes himself to be mentally ill may
apply to the head"' of a hospital... for voluntary admission.'89 Application
184 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5122.01 (C) (Page Supp. 1976) defines patient to mean "a per-
son admitted either voluntarily or involuntarily to a hospital or other place" pursuant to the
Act "who is under observation or receiving treatment in such place."
185 OHo REV. CODE ANN. § 2111.01 (D) (Page 1976) defines incompetent to mean "any
person who by reason of advanced age, improvidence, or mental or physical disability or
infirmity, chronic alcoholism, mental retardation, or mental illness, is incapable of taking
proper care of himself or his property or fails to provide for his family or other persons
for whom he is charged by law to provide, or any person confined to a penal institution
within this state."
186 Id. § 2111.01 (A) defines a guardian.
187 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.01 (K) (Page Supp. 1976).
188 Hospital is defined as "a hospital or part thereof licensed by the division of mental
health of the Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation . . . and any institution,
hospital, or other place established, controlled, or supervised by the department . OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.01 (F) (Page Supp. 1976).
189 Id. § 5122.02 (A). The provision in this section which allowed any person at least
sixteen years of age who believed he was mentally ill due to drug abuse and in danger of
becoming drug dependent to apply for voluntary admission has been deleted. 133 Ohio
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for admission for one iunder 18 years of age may be made on his behalf by a
parent or guardian or by the one having custody, and for an adult incom-
petent person by his guardian or the one having custody.' Subject to suitable
accommodations, the head of the hospital was formerly under a statutory
duty to admit voluntary patients for diagnosis, care, or treatment; now,
however, such patients may be admitted unless the head of the hospital finds
that hospitalization is inappropriate.' The requirement that residents of
the state who are applicants for voluntary admission to a public hospital"9 2
must be residents of the hospital district has also been eliminated. 9
A newly enacted portion of Section 5122.021'" provides that, if appli-
cation for admission has been made on behalf of a minor or one adjudicated
incompetent because of mental illness, the court shall determine upon
petition by the legal rights service,"9 5 private or appointed counsel, a relative,
or one acting as next friend, whether the admission or continued hospitali-
zation is in the minor or incompetent's best interest.'96 This safeguard is in
addition to the retained statutory obligation of the head of the hospital to
discharge any voluntary patient who has recovered or whose hospitalization
he determines to be no longer advisable. 9 "
2. Right to Release of Voluntary Patients
The new section providing for court determination upon request as to
whether the admission or continued hospitalization of a minor or incompetent
is in his best interest appears to recognize several potential inadequacies in
the applicability of existing provisions relating to the release of voluntary
patients. A voluntary patient shall be released if he requests his release in
writing or if his counsel, legal guardian, parent, spouse, or adult next of kin
Laws 2745 (1970). Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5122.041 (A) (Page Supp. 1976) provides
for the establishment of special facilities for the care and treatment of drug dependent
persons.
190 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5122.02 (B) (Page Supp. 1976).
291 Id.
192 A public hospital is "a facility which is tax-supported and under the jurisdiction of the
Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation." Id. § 5122.01 (G).
19 3OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.02 (Page 1970) (amended 1976).
'14 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.02 (C) (Page Supp. 1976).
195 A legal rights service is established under § 5123.94 of the Ohio Revised Code (Page
Supp. 1976).
196 See Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (requiring that children,
before being committed to a mental hospital, be afforded due process rights including a
probable cause hearing, written notice, and the right to counsel). For a critique on the
Bartley decision, see Rolfe and MacClintock, The Due Process Rights of Minors "Volun-
tarily Admitted" to Mental Institutions, 4 J. PSYCH. & L. 333 (1976).
197 OmIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.02 (C) (Page Supp. 1976). The provision of this section
which gave the head of the hospital discretion as to the discharge of a voluntary patient
if such discharge contributed to the effective use of the hospital has been eliminated. OHIo
REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.02 (Page 1970) (amended 1976).
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requests it,"9 8 except when the head of the hospital files an affidavit'99 for
his detention pursuant to Section 5122.11.100 A limitation, however, upon the
release of a patient who admitted himself is that such release, when written
application is made by another, is conditioned upon the patient's approval."'
Moreover, the requirement that a minor's release may be conditioned upon
the consent of his parent or guardian has been deleted." 2
Although the head of the hospital is legally required to provide reason-
able means and arrangements for informing voluntary patients of their
rights to release and to assist them in presenting such requests,0 ' a minor
may be too young to comprehend his right to request release or unwilling
or unable to withstand the possible emotional conflict of opposing the parent's
or guardian's decision for hospitalization." ' An adult incompetent may also
lack the capacity to sufficiently understand his right to request his release
in writing or the ability to do so.2"'
Even if admission to the hospital or continued hospitalization is no
longer in the best interest of a minor or incompetent, those authorized
under Section 5122.03... to request his release in writing may not agree
or may be unaware that hospitalization is not in his best interest. That the
legal rights service or one acting as next friend are included in those autho-
rized to petition the court for a determination of whether the admission or
continued hospitalization is in the minor or incompetent's best interest0 '
gives further potential protection to persons whose "voluntary" admission
has been sought by a parent or guardian.0 8
The right of any voluntary patient to be released upon written request
198 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.03 (Page Supp. 1976).
1") The affidavit is to allege facts sufficient to indicate probable cause that such person is
a mentally ill person subject to hospitalization by court order. See text accompanying notes
76-79 supra. Under the prior law, the affidavit was to state that in the opinion of the head
of the hospital, the patient was mentally ill and release would be unsafe for the patient
or others. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.03 (A) (3) (Page 1970) (amended 1976).
200 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.03 (B) (Page Supp. 1976).
201 Id. § 5122.03 (A).
202 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.03 (A) (2) (Page 1970) (amended 1976).
203 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.03 (B) (Page Supp. 1976). The right to assistance in pre-
paring requests includes those for a probable cause hearing.
204 See Rolfe and MacClintock, The Due Process Right of Minors "Voluntarily Admitted"
to Mental Institutions, 4 J. PsYcH. & L. 333, 340, 351 (1976).
205 See Dewey, Imprisonment of the Mentally Ill: An Inquiry into the Deprivation of Civil
Liberties Under Ohio Laws and Procedures, I CAP. U. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1972).
206 The patient's counsel, legal guardian, parent, spouse, or adult next of kin.
.20 Oio REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.02 (C) (Page Supp. 1976).
208 Dewey, supra note 89, at 3-4, discusses the senile person and the person against whom
involuntary commitment proceedings have been initiated, both of whom may be persuaded
to "voluntarily" admit themselves. These two categories of "voluntary" patients do not
appear to be covered under-Section 5122.02 (C) (Page Supp. 1976).
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is qualified by the provision allowing the head of the hospital to commence
court proceedings by filing an affidavit with the court within three days
from the receipt of the request.0 9 Release may then be postponed until either
a probable cause21 or full hearing 11 is held. 12 Unless the person is released
within three days from the receipt of the request by the head of the hospital,
such request shall also serve as a request for a probable cause hearing under
Section 5122.141.1 Since the period of time which may elapse before
judicial proceedings must be initiated has been shortened from ten days to
three days,2" ' thus giving a patient less time to become acclimated to the
hospital surroundings and conditions, it seems likely that more requests for
release will be made. Therefore, if continued detention is desired, additional
proceedings for involuntary hospitalization will have to be commenced, a
requirement not within the prior law. Yet, if a patient is not mentally ill
to the extent that he represents a substantial risk of harm to himself or others,
he should not have to spend one day longer than necessary in the hospital.
Moreover, if his condition does meet the criteria for one who is mentally
ill and subject to involuntary hospitalization, 1 ' the few additional days in the
hospital would probably not be sufficient to alter measurably his condition
prior to a judicial hearing and subsequent determination concerning his
status.
If the court finds probable cause to believe that the voluntary patient is
a "mentally ill person subject to hospitalization by court order," all pro-
visions of Chapter 5122 of the Ohio Revised Code relating to involuntary
hospitalization are applicable to him."' Since judicial proceedings for hos-
pitalization of voluntary patients shall not be instituted except pursuant to
the provisions for requests for release,"' there is some assurance to a
person considering voluntary admittance or to one already admitted that
he has a certain amount of control over his status in the hospital. Yet, the
potential "threat" of court proceedings still may operate to a degree as a
209 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.03 (B) (Page Supp. 1976). A telephone call from the
head of the hospital within three court days from the receipt of the request for release,
notifying the court that the affidavit has been mailed, sufficiently complies with the time
limitation for such filing. Id. See note 199 supra.
210 See text, Part II. § (A) (5) supra.
21Id. § (A) (6).
212 Under the prior law, release could be postponed for as long as the court deemed to be
necessary for commencement of proceedings under Section 5122.11-.15, but not for more
than ten days. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.03 (A) (3) (Page 1970) (amended 1976).
213 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.03 (B) (Page Supp. 1976). As noted earlier, the head
of the hospital is to provide information and assistance in this regard. See note 203 supra.
214 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.03 (A) (3) (Page 1970) (amended 1976).
215 See text accompanying notes 53-57 supra.
216 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.03 (B) (Page Supp. 1976).
211 Id.
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deterrent to voluntary admissions since one can be completely sure of
remaining voluntarily hospitalized only until he attempts to leave.
D. Involuntary Hospitalization
1. Admission of Involuntary Patients
The involuntary hospitalization procedures of the new Ohio civil com-
mitment act have eliminated two of the four previous methods of involuntary
hospitalization and, in addition, provide substantive and procedural due
process rights for those taken into custody pursuant to the Act.218 The two
procedures now available for the compulsory hospitalization of persons
alleged to be mentally ill and to represent a substantial risk of barm are the
"emergency ' ' 19 and the "judicial. 22 ° If admission is applied for under one
of these procedures, any person whose behavior and condition is believed
to necessitate psychiatric medical emergency treatment must be received
by the head of a public hospital121 for observation, diagnosis, care, and
treatment. No longer available for the involuntary hospitalization of a person
under this Act are the non-protest form of admission entitled "non-judicial
hospitalization"2 2 and the procedure entitled "emergency hospitalization
with medical certificate.
'2 2 3
Section 5122.05 has been amended to provide specifically for exclusion
from compulsory hospitalization any person who is being treated by spiritual
means through prayer alone according to a recognized religious method of
healing, unless the court has determined that such person "represents a
substantial risk of impairment or injury to himself or others. '2 2' Apparently,
218 See text accompanying notes 231-34 infra.
219 OmIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.05 (A) (1) (Page Supp. 1976).
22 0 1d. § 5122.05 (A) (2).
221 Id. § 5122.05 (A). In addition, the head of a hospital, other than a public hospital,
has discretion to receive such person.
222 This permitted an individual who did not object in writing to be confined in a hospital
for a period as long as ninety days. The procedure could be instituted by a friend, relative,
spouse, guardian, health or public welfare officer, or the head of any institution in which
he might be. Two physicians had to certify that they examined the person and believed he
was a "mentally ill individual subject to hospitalization by court order". OmIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 5122.06 (Page 1970) (repealed 1976). Also applicable to this procedure was §
5122.18 (Page 1970) (amended 1976), requiring notice to be given to the patient's guardian,
spouse or next of kin if one of such persons did not admit the patient, and § 5122.24
(Page 1970) (repealed 1976) requiring the patient's release upon written request unless
judicial proceedings were commenced within ten days.
223 An individual could be confined in a hospital for up to sixty days upon application by
any person stating the belief that he is likely to cause injury to himself or others if not
immediately restrained and upon certification by one physician that he examined the person
and believed him to be mentally ill and therefore likely to injure himself or others if not
immediately restrained. Notice and request for release provisions were applicable here also.
Oro REV. CODE Am. § 5122.08 (Page 1970) (repealed 1976).
224 tro REv. CODE ANN. § 5122.05 (B) (Page Supp. 1976).
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a person to whom this provision is applicable is not subject to being involun-
tarily hospitalized through the use of the emergency procedure," 5 but is
subject only to judicial hospitalization which requires a court determination
that there is probable cause to believe that the person is a "mentally ill
person subject to hospitalization by court order"2 6 preceding detention.
An individual must be considered to represent "a substantial risk of
physical harm to himself or others if allowed to remain at liberty pending
examination" '27 before he may be taken into custody pursuant to the emer-
gency detention provision. Thus, to effectuate the legislative intent that such
allegedly dangerous persons be removed at least temporarily to surround-
ings2 8 where the potential harm may be prevented, judicial proceedings
could be initiated immediately by the filing of an affidavit pursuant to
Section 5122.11 and an order issued without delay for the person's
detention. 9 The question might be raised as to why this procedure requiring
a preliminary hearing to indicate probable cause prior to confinement is
not equally applicable with respect to those not being treated according to a
recognized religious method of healing who are detained under the emer-
gency provision."'
Section 5122.05 (C), as amended, affords further substantive and
procedural rights to any person involuntarily hospitalized or taken into
custody under the Act. Immediately upon being detained, such person shall
be informed and provided with a written statement that he may:
(1) Immediately telephone or use other reasonable means to contact
an attorney, a physician, a licensed clinical psychologist" 1 or
other persons for the purpose of securing counsel or obtaining
medical or psychological assistance, and be provided assistance
in making the calls if needed and requested;
(2) Retain counsel" and have independent expert evaluation2  of
225 Id. § 5122.10.
226 Id. § 5122.141.
2 2
7 Id. § 5122.10.
228 Section 5122.17 of the Ohio Revised Code (Page Supp. 1976) provides in part that,
pending removal to a hospital, a person taken into custody or ordered hospitalized under
the Act may be detained for not more than forty-eight hours in his home, a licensed rest
or nursing home, a licensed or unlicensed hospital, a mental health clinical facility, or a
county home.
229 This situation might, however, present a problem if the behavior which is considered to
warrant detention occurs at night, on a holiday or on a weekend.
230 See generally arguments opposed to emergency commitments in Roth, Dayley, and
Lerner, Into the Abyss: Psychiatric Reliability and Emergency Commitment Statutes, 13
SANTA CLARA LAW. 400 (1973).
231 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.01 (I) (Page Supp. 1976).
232 See text accompanying notes 128-30 supra.
233 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.01 (P) (Page Supp. 1976).
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his mental condition; if unable to obtain an attorney, he may be
represented by court appointed counsel and have the independent
evaluation at public expense;
(3) Be granted a hearing, upon request, to determine whether there
is probable cause to believe he is a mentally ill person subject to
hospitalization by court order. 3 '
However, as with the voluntary hospitalization "right to release" provision,"'5
a person who has been involuntarily taken into custody might be incapable
of understanding these rights, especially if they are not adequately presented
or if the required assistance is not offered to him. 36
Section 5122.06, as newly enacted, provides that an attorney shall be
designated by either the director of the Department of Mental Health and
Mental Retardation or the head of the hospital (if the patient is not in a
hospital operated by the Department). The attorney shall present the case
demonstrating that the respondent. 7 is a "mentally ill person subject to
hospitalization by court order" on behalf of the state or the hospital at the
probable cause and full hearings"'s held pursuant to this Act.
2. Emergency Hospitalization
Any psychiatrist," 9 licensed clinical psychologist, licensed physician," '°
health or police officer, or sheriff, 1 who has reason to believe that an
individual is "a mentally ill person subject to hospitalization by court order"
and represents a substantial risk of physical harm to himself or others if
allowed to remain at liberty pending examination, may take the person into
custody 42 and immediately transport him to a hospital.2 "4 The transporting
person must give to the receiving hospital a written statement presenting
the circumstances and reasons for which the individual has been taken into
custody. This statement must be made available to the respondent or his
attorney upon the request of either.24" Relevant to this provision, Section
234 See text accompanying notes 53-57 supra.
235 Otno REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.03 (Page Supp. 1976). See text accompanying notes
198-200 supra.
236 See Dewey, supra note 89, at 3-4; Roth, Dayley, Lerner, supra note 19, at 416-22.
237 Respondent is defined by § 5122.01 (N) (Page Supp. 1976).
238 See notes 210-11 supra.
239 Psychiatrist is defined by § 5122.01 (E) (Page Supp. 1976).
240 Licensed physician is defined by § 5122.01 (D) (Page Supp. 1976).
241 The prior law did not specify psychiatrist, licensed clinical psychologist, or licensed
physician. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.10 (Page 1970) (amended 1976).
242 See text accompanying notes 231-34 supra.
243 This section further provides that "every reasonable and appropriate effort shall be
made to take persons into custody in the least conspicous manner possible."
244 Prior to amendment, the statement was required to be given only to the hospital and
need not be in writing. In addition, the head of the hospital had ten working days to make
Slimmer, 1977]
36
Akron Law Review, Vol. 11 [1978], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol11/iss1/4
AKRON LAW REVIEW
5122.34 provides that persons acting reasonably and in good faith, who
assisted in the hospitalization procedure, are released from any criminal or
civil liability.
If the person taken into custody is transported to a general hospital,
that hospital may provide treatment, but within 24 hours after admission
the person must be transferred to a hospital" 5 as defined under this Act.
After the person has been transported to a proper hospital or mental health
facility,2"' he must be examined by the staff within 24 hours.47 Then, unless
the head of the hospital believes that the person is a "mentally ill person
subject to hospitalization by court order" or a court has issued a temporary
detention order pursuant to judicial hospitalization, he shall discharge the
person immediately. 2" If the head of the hospital does believe the person
is "mentally ill subject to hospitalization by court order," he may detain
him for not more than three court days following the examination. During
this period, he must either arrange for the voluntary admission of the patient
pursuant to Section 5122.02249 or file an affidavit pursuant to Section
5122.11. If he does neither and a temporary detention order has not been
issued by the court, the patient must be discharged at the end of the three-day
period. 25° In addition, upon his own, his guardian's or his counsel's request,
the patient must be given a probable cause hearing. Such hearing shall
be held within three court days from the date of the request, unless continued
for good cause shown, which continuance may not be extended for more than
ten days after the request. 251
Prior to the present amendment, a person hospitalized under this section
could be held up to five days.252 Although the emergency procedure now
provides for a three-day detention period, a person who has first been
transported to a general hospital and then to a hospital authorized under this
Act will still have been confined lawfully for a five-day period before the
affidavit must be filed or before his release takes place. However, as Section
5122.05 (C) states that a person involuntarily detained is to be immediately
informed of his right to request a probable cause hearing which must be
held within three days after the request, utilization of this procedure by a
a report of the admission to the Division of Mental Hygiene. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
5122.10 (B) (Page 1970) (amended 1976).
245 OmIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.01 (F) (Page Supp. 1976).
246 Id. § 5122.01 (H).
247 Id. § 5122.10.
248 Id.
240 See text accompanying notes 209-13 supra on voluntary admission; Dewey, supra note
89, at 4.
250 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.10 (Page Supp. 1976).
251 Id. § 5122.141.
252 OHIO REV. CODE ANN, § 5122.10 (Page 1970) (amended 1976).
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patient before being transported might effectively limit his time in custody
to three days.2"
E. Summary
The safeguards which have been enacted in Ohio's new civil commitment
act to protect the rights of those coming within its purview provide a substan-
tial improvement over the former commitment procedures for the hospitali-
zation of the mentally ill. A person may no longer be committed for
indefinite periods of time without any assurance of having a formal hearing
to determine not only whether he is mentally ill but also whether, because
of his illness, he is a substantial risk of harm to himself or others, a necessary
finding for involuntary hospitalization.
While voluntary commitment would seem to be a preferable procedure
for treatment of the mentally ill, the Act could have gone further in
encouraging its use. For, although the legal rights service and one acting
as next friend are now included in those who may help oversee the legal
rights of persons "voluntarily" committed by parents or guardians, any
voluntary patient who requests his release may become subject to involuntary
hospitalization if the head of the hospital files an affidavit for a probable cause
hearing and such hearing results in the court's finding that such patient meets
the criteria for commitment. The uncertainty that one will be able to remain
a truly "voluntary" patient after he requests to leave the hospital may
discourage wide use of the voluntary admission procedure.
M. NEW SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS FOR OHIO'S MENTALLY ILL
The new Mental Health Act marks a major effort to improve the status
and care of mental patients in Ohio. It provides a comprehensive list of
rights, most of which were not contained in the prior law. These rights can
be grouped into four general categories: the right to treatment, the right
to a humane environment, the right to maximum freedom, and the right to
refuse unwanted treatment.
A. The Right to Treatment
1. The Impetus Behind the Adoption of a Right to Treatment
Since Dr. Birnbaum wrote his article, The Right to Treatment" ' in
1960, the subject has received much attention by both courts and legal
commentators.2 15 Dr. Birnbaum proposed that
253 See Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1091 (E.D. Wis. 1972) stating that
"[E]ven a short detention in a mental facility may have long lasting effects on the individual's
ability to function in the outside world due to the stigma attached to mental illness."
254 Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960).
255 E.g., A Symposium on the Right to Treatment, 57 GEo. L.J. 673 (1969); Birnbaum, Some
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the courts under their traditional powers to protect the constitutional
rights of our citizens begin to consider the problem of whether or not
a person who has been institutionalized solely because he is sufficiently
mentally ill to require institutionalization for care and treatment actually
does receive adequate medical treatment so that he may regain his
health, and therefore his liberty, as soon as possible.256
Birnbaum adopted what in essence amounts to a substantive due process
approach,257 with his legal argument as follows: the mentally ill, involun-
tarily committed only because they need care and treatment, become no
more than prisoners if that care and treatment is not provided. Since, without
treatment, there is no motive for the confinement, the hospitalization amounts
to a deprivation of liberty without due process of law.25
Since that time several courts have recognized a constitutionally based
right to treatment. Judicial acceptance of this right has been based on various
theories, including a violation of due process," 9 deprivation of equal pro-
tection of the law,' and avoidance of cruel and unusual punishment.2"'
Remarks on "The Right to Treatment," 23 ALA. L. REv. 623 (1971); Katz, supra note 48;
Szasz, supra note 42; Note, Persons in Need of Supervision: Is There a Constitutional
Right to Treatment? 39 BROOKLYN L. REV. 624 (1973); Note, Guaranteeing Treatment for
the Committed Mental Patient: The Troubled Enforcement of an Elusive Right, 32 MD.
L. REv. 42 (1972); Note, Reflections on the Right to Treatment, 8 NEw ENGLAND L. REv.
231 (1973); Note, Involuntary Civil Commitment-A Constitutional Right to Treatment,
23 SYRACUSE L. REV. 125 (1972); Note, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness, and the Right to
Treatment, 77 YALE L.J. 87 (1967).
256 Birnbaum, supra note 254, at 503.
257 Id.
258 Id.
259 Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 519-27 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated, 422 U.S. 563,
reh. denied sub nom., Gumanis v. Donaldson, 423 U.S. 885 (1975); Rouse v. Cameron,
373 F.2d 451, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (dictum); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, on sub-
mission of proposed standards by defendants 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971) enforced
344 F. Supp. 373 (1972), aff'd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
The Wyatt court reasoned that since the purpose of confinement was to rehabilitate, com-
mitment could not be justified unless the patient was in fact given a realistic opportunity
to cure or improve his condition. 325 F. Supp. at 784.
26Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d at 453 (dictum); In re Anonymous, 69 Misc. 2d 181,
329 N.Y.S.2d 542 (Sup. Ct. 1972). The basis for this argument is that if the state interest
served by commitment is the protection of society, commitment statutes are both over-
inclusive (since most mentally ill people are not dangerous) and underinclusive (since
dangerous individuals who are not mentally ill are not subject to preventive detention).
The statutes authorizing commitment can then be justified only by the prospect of treat-
ment; if treatment is not in fact provided, there is no constitutional basis for the confine-
ment. Civil Commitment, supra note 19, at 1329-30.
261 Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d at 453 (dictum); Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575
(S.D.N.Y. 1972); People ex rel. Kaganovitch v. Wilkins, 23 App. Div. 2d 178, 259 N.Y.S.2d
462 (1965).
The cases which rely on the eighth amendment as the basis for a right to treatment
commonly refer to Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), where the Supreme Court
struck down a statute which made it a crime to be a heroin addict. The Court reasoned
that in that case punishment was directed at status alone without the presence of anti-social
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The fundamental idea in these cases is that there must be a good reason to
confine a person against his will. If the reason asserted is that confinement
will be good for him-and perhaps also for society-because he can receive
treatment, it should be a certainty that such treatment will be forthcoming.
Moreover, if the person is not treated, his condition is likely to worsen, 2 '
and he thus suffers a double penalty. Though this issue has yet to be decided
by the United States Supreme Court, the question was presented in
Donaldson v. O'Connor.263 There the Fifth Circuit had ruled in favor of the
right, but the Supreme Court did not discuss the right to treatment issue
except to vacate the Fifth Circuit's decision on the ground that the ruling
in regard to treatment was unnecessary. The Supreme Court held that
the petitioner was entitled to the release which he had requested
because he was not dangerous to himself or others and had also shown
ability to take care of himself by'securing a responsible job. "
Although the issue is far from being settled on the federal level, the
trend towards recognition of a constitutional right to treatment may well
have influenced the Ohio legislature to provide a detailed and comprehen-
sive statutory plan setting forth a right to treatment." In addition, there
conduct. In the course of its opinion the Court analogized punishment for drug addiction to
punishment for mental illness in the following way:
It is unlikely that any State . . . would attempt to make it a criminal offense for a person
to be mentally ill ... . [A] law which made a criminal offense of such a disease would
doubtless be universally thought to be an infliction of cruel and unusual punishment
in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments.
Id. at 666.
However, it must be recalled that this strong sounding statement was only dictum and
not at all necessary to the Court's conclusion in the Robinson case. More importantly,
civil commitment statutes do not in fact make it a crime to be mentally ill; on the contrary,
such legislation usually purports to have a beneficent purpose rather than a penal one.
The fact that confinement results does not mean that a constitutional violation has neces-
sarily occurred. As discussed earlier, commitment statutes have been justified on the ground
that they are a valid exercise of the police power or of the parens patriae authority. See
note 31 and accompanying text supra.
262See, e.g., Renelli v. Commissioner of Mental Hygiene, 73 Misc. 2d 261, 340 N.Y.S.2d
498 (Sup. Ct. 1973), where a retarded girl was confined for twelve years in an institution
where there was no attempt made to treat her. Her mother testified that, prior to her
admission, she was "a cheerful, gentle child and had no tendency to inflict physical harm
on herself." Id. at 264, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 502. Even five years later she was described as
"affectionate, content, played well with others and could dress herself." Id. However, after
being institutionalized for twelve years for her own good, she was "cranky, anti-social,
withdrawn, belligerent, unable to dress herself, and having a pronounced tendency to do
herself and others physical damage." Id. Such deterioration is usually directly traceable
to the lack of an adequate environment and insufficient stimulation. Examination of Ex-
pert Psychiatric Witness in MR Treatment Case, 1 MENTAL DISABILrrY L. REP. 299,
303-04 (1977).
263 493 F.2d 507
264 O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. at 573.
265 Other jurisdictions have also created statutory rights to treatment. E.g., D.C. CODE
§ 21-562 (1973); IDAHO CODE § 66-344 (Supp. 1977); IOWA CODE § 225.15 (Supp. 1977-78)
("treatment . . . as in the physician's judgment [is] necessary"); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 202.840
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is Ohio law which may have been influential. The Ohio Constitution pro-
vides that "[i]nstitutions for the benefit of the insane . . . shall always be
fostered and supported by the state; and be subject to such regulations as
may be prescribed by the general assembly."26 The courts of Ohio have
interpreted this provision to mean that the state is obligated to provide
proper care for the mentally ill.6 ' The exact manner in which this care is
to be provided has, in the past, been ruled to be the legislature's concern;",
however, the old statute did provide that the hospital "shall examine and
treat"' 9 the patient and that "[e]very patient shall be entitled to humane
care and treatment and, to the extent that facilities, equipment, and per-
sonnel are available, to medical care and treatment in accordance with the
highest standards accepted in medical practice."270
Nevertheless, the state constitutional and statutory provisions have not
enabled Ohio citizens who are mentally ill to receive adequate treatment.
Because the institutions are located in rural areas, comfortably remote from
the public eye, and because the Department of Mental Hygiene and Cor-
rections was not accessible to inspection or consultation on a regular basis
by professional groups, the courts, or the news media, Ohio's mental patients
were provided with shockingly substandard care.' When friends and rela-
tives of the mental patients began publicizing the degrading conditions at
the state institutions, state officials began to investigate."' The legislators
were surprised to learn that members of the department itself describdd the
"patient care as essentially custodial and of extremely low quality and the
Department as under-funded, under-staffed, and poorly supported."' " They
set up a task force to investigate the situation in a comprehensive way. Its
investigation found that the institutions were providing "little more than the
(Vernon 1972) ("to the extent that facilities, equipment and personnel are available");
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-2-13 (Supp. 1975) ("to the extent that facilities, equipment and
personnel are available"); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 15.03 (a) (McKinney 1976) ("treat-
ment that is suited to [the patient's] needs and skillfully, safely and humanely administered
with full respect for his dignity and personal integrity"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 A,§§ 2, 91 (West 1954); TEx. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-70 (Vernon 1958) ("adequate medical and
psychiatric care and treatment . . . in accordance with the highest standards accepted in
medical practice"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-7-46 (1968) ("to the extent that facilities,
equipment, and personnel are available").
266 OmO CONST. art. VII, § 1.
267 State ex rel. Goebel v. Brown, 4 Ohio L. Abs. 333 (Ct. App. Hamilton County 1926);
Gollwitzer v. Gorman, 3 Ohio Op. 426, 428 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1935).
268 State v. Kiessewetter, 37 Ohio St. 546, 549 (1882); Doren v. Fleming, 6 Ohio C.C.
(n.s.) 81, 85, (1905).
2'5 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.15 (Page 1970) (amended 1976) (emphasis added).
270 Id. § 5122.27 (emphasis added).
271 TASK FORCE, supra note 2 at 5-20.
272 See, e.g., Anger Made Her an Activist, Akron Beacon J., Jan. 23, 1977, at F5.
271 TASK FORCE, supra note 2 at 5-20.
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most primitive form of custodial, institutional care,""7' and that there were
"insufficient personnel to provide programs of rehabilitation and resocializa-
tion."2" Also, the personnel were inadequately trained,"" and problems
existed in "availability of service, coordination of services, the physical
plant in which the service is rendered, in funding, . . . in the inadequacy of
standards and the lack of support from the citizen sector.""' "
Litigation attacking the inadequacy of conditions and treatment pro-
grams existing inside the institutions also put pressure on the legislature. In
Sidles v. Delaney,"8 parents of residents at Apple Creek State Institute for
the Mentally Retarded filed a massive federal civil rights suit against the
state in order to force improvements at the institution. A consent decree
was entered in which the state agreed to a staged program focusing on
staffing, programmatic development, deinstitutionalization, and compliance
with professional accreditation requirements. In Rone v. Fireman,"' patients
at a state mental institution alleged that the hospital administrators failed
to provide adequate treatment programs; that facilities, staff and supplies
did not meet constitutional standards; that patients were unnecessarily and
inappropriately medicated, denied personal privacy, and subjected to a
degrading and inhumane environment of continual violence and abuse from
both staff and other patients. The patients claimed to have deteriorated
physically, emotionally and mentally as a result of their confinement in the
institution. The suit was postponed pending passage of the new Mental
Health Act,28 but is now scheduled for trial on January 3, 1978.182
2. Ohio's Statutory Right to Treatment
The new statute provides for an upgrading of mental health services
offered to the citizens of Ohio. By April 1, 1977,82 the Department of Mental
Health and Mental Retardation was supposed to have set standards for
treatment "consistent wherever possible with standards set by the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals." '283 In addition, by July 1, 1978,
the director of the Department is to enter into agreements with medical
274 Id. at 5-63.
275 Id.
2 S ld. at 5-90.
277 d. at 5-64.
278No. C75-300A (N.D. Ohio, Apr. 26, 1976), summarized in 1 MENTAL DISABILITY L.
REP. 19 (1976).
279No. C75-355A (N.D. Ohio). The allegations in the complaint are summarized in 1
MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 34 (1976).
280 1 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 34 (1976).
281 Judge Contie Faces Heart Surgery, Akron Beacon J., Sept. 4, 1977, at D1.
282 136 Ohio Laws 4-268 (1976).
288 OmIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.27 (C) (Page Supp. 1976).
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schools "to establish, manage, and conduct residency medical training pro-
grams." 8' A Residency Training Committee is to conduct residency training
at one or more state mental institutions; it is also to assist the department
"by advising about medical research, and training programs that will improve
treatment, secure and maintain academic, professional, and institutional
accreditation and enhance the reputation of the institutions." '285 By July 1,
1979, the Department and any institutions under its supervision or jurisdic-
tion are compelled to "meet or exceed standards set forth for psychiatric and
mental retardation facilities by the Joint Commission." 8 ' The Joint Mental
Health and Mental Retardation Advisory and Review Commission is to act
as a watchdog over the quality of care provided. Among its other duties, it
is to "[s]tudy the effectiveness of patient care and treatment and the avail-
ability of services for mentally ill ... at state mental health... facilities.""2 '
The new Act provides for the individual patient's right to treatment. 28
More significantly, in light of the manner in which the right to treatment
was regarded under the prior statute, the new statute provides rules for
implementation of the right to treatment, effective April 1, 1977. The
statute provides that
The head of the hospital or his designee shall assure that all patients
hospitalized pursuant to Chapter 5122. of the Revised Code shall:
(A) Receive, within twenty days of their admission sufficient profes-
sional care to assure that an evaluation of current status, differen-
tial diagnosis, probable prognosis, and description of the current
treatment plan is stated on the official chart;
(B) Have a written treatment plan consistent with the evaluation,
diagnosis, prognosis, and goals . . .;
(C) Receive treatment consistent with the treatment plan ...
284 Id. § 5119.492 (A).
285 Id. § 5119.492 (C) (7).
2 86 1d. § 5119.10.
287 Id. § 5119.801 (C).
288 All patients hospitalized pursuant to Chapter 5122. of the Revised Code shall:
(F) receive humane care and treatment, including without limitation, the following:
(1) The least restrictive environment consistent with the treatment plan;
(2) The necessary facilities and personnel required by the treatment plan;(3) A humane psychological and physical environment within the hospital facilities;
(4) The right to obtain current information concerning his treatment program
and expectations in terms that he can reasonably understand;
(5) Participation in programs designed to afford him substantial opportunity to
acquire skills to facilitate his return to the community;
(6) The right to be free from unnecessary or excessive medication;
(7) Freedom from restraints or isolation unless it is stated in a written order
by the head of the hospital or his designee, or the patient's individual physician
or psychologist in a private or general hospital.
Id. § 5122.27 (Page Supp. 1976).
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(D) Receive periodic reevaluations of the treatment plan by the pro-
fessional staff of the hospital at intervals not to exceed ninety
days .... 289
Thus, individualized treatment plans which must be drawn up for each
patient provide evidence that the hospital has focused on the individual's
unique problems. 19 Adequate treatment requires more than proper facilities,
staff and advanced programs; each person requires individualized attention
and a plan for treatment, and that is now required by statute. And the fact
that the plan must be updated periodically helps to insure that the promise
of treatment is actually being carried out. 29' The recordkeeping ought not
to be unduly burdensome, as the required system is similar to the "medical
audit" widely used in general medical hospitals.
292
Moreover, the treatment plan is not a secret document to be kept solely
for viewing by the hospital staff, but is to be made available "upon request
of the patient or patient's counsel, to the patient's counsel and to any private
physician or licensed clinical psychologist designated by the patient or his
counsel or to the legal rights service. "21' Thus, independent evaluation and
judicial review are facilitated should a question arise concerning the adequacy
of treatment.
3. Judicial Review
When judicial review is contemplated, the question arises as to what
constitutes adequate treatment and who decides what this treatment entails.
The establishment of a right to treatment has been criticized on the ground
that courts are not competent to judge the adequacy of treatment.29' Many
types of therapy are available, many of which are new, and some of which
produce drastic effects. It would appear that the situation is further compli-
cated by factors unique to the individual which must be considered in weighing
the merits and risks of these therapies. 95 Considering these factors, one
court has held that adequacy of treatment is non-judicable. 98 However,
289 Id.
29o This consideration for the individual is essential to any meaningful right to treatment.
Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. Cm. L. REV. 742, 746 (1969) [here-
inafter cited as Bazelon].
291 Id.
292 Schwitzgebel, The Right to Effective Mental Treatment, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 936, 939
(1974).
293 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.27 (B) (Page Supp. 1976).
294 Note, Conditioning and Other Technologies Used to "Treat?" "Rehabilitate?" "Demolish?"
Prisoners and Mental Patients, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 616, 650 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Prisoners and Mental Patients].
295 Id.
296 Burnham v. Department of Public Health, 349 F. Supp. 1335, 1341-42 (N.D. Ga. 1972),
rev'd, 503 F.2d 1319 (5th Cir. 1974).
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other courts have circumvented these problems by the use of one of two
methods that have been developed whereby they are able to enforce a right
to treatment without assuming the role of a practicing physician." '9
The first method sets standards for the institutions themselves on the
theory that certain physical conditions must exist in order for effective
therapy to occur."' For example, in Wyatt v. Stickney 99 the court, which
recognized a right to treatment, set forth a detailed list of requirements to
be met in an effort to enforce that right. The plan was composed of three
general categories: "(1) a humane psychological and physical environment,
(2) qualified staff in numbers sufficient to administer adequate treatment,
and (3) individualized treatment plans." ' This task has been accomplished
in Ohio by the enactment of the new Mental Health Act; institutional stan-
dards similar to those ordered by the Wyatt court exist in the statute."0'
Presumably, any deviations from the statutory requirements can be corrected
by court order.
The second method focuses on the individual and the precise treatment
that the patient has received. In addition to ruling on the adequacy of tangible
attributes of the institution, Judge Bazelon, who made the first judicial
formulation of the right to treatment,"0 believes that lack of psychiatric
expertise should not hinder courts from ruling on the adequacy of treatment
in regard to a specific case. He points out that courts often decide questions
depending on specialized knowledge; they make complicated decisions in-
volving such diverse subjects as economics, aeronautical engineering, atomic
energy and, it might be noted, the adequacy of treatment in cases involving
physical illness-not from any special expertise of their own, but with the
297 Civil Commitment, supra note 19, at 1337.
298 Id.
299 334 F. Supp. at 1343.
300 The Wyatt court found that humane conditions must exist for any therapy to be effective
and directed the hospitals to make provision for patients' privacy and dignity, freedom
from all but a minimal amount of physical restraint and isolation, use of personal clothing
and possessions, religious worship, social contact with the opposite sex and regular outdoor
activity. 344 F. Supp. at 379-81. Specific staff-to-patient ratios were delineated as the min-
imum necessary to provide adequate treatment. Id. at 383-84. Treatment plans were re-
quired so that the hospitals would be forced to consider the individualized needs of each
patient. Id. at 384-85.
201 The new statute also recognizes personal rights of patients similar to those set forth
by the Wyatt court. See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.29 (Page Supp. 1976). The setting
of institutional standards was delegated to the Department of Mental Health and Mental
Retardation. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.27 (C) (Page Supp. 1976). These standards
have not yet been promulgated, probably because legislation designed to amend the current
statute is currently pending before the House (but the right to treatment will not be af-
fected). See Sub. H.B. No. 725 (1977). The provision for individualized treatment plans
is set out at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.27 (B) (Page Supp. 1976).
302 Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
[Vol  11: 1
45
Gui et al.: Ohio Mental Health Act
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1978
LEGISLATIVE'COMMENT
help of expert evidence presented to them."'3 Moreover, he sees the judge's
role as a limited one, similar to that in a case of administrative review. In
Tribby v. Cameron, " he stated:
We do not suggest that the court should or can decide what particular
treatment this patient requires. The court's function here resembles
ours when we review agency action. We do not decide whether the
agency has made the best decision, but only make sure that it has
made a permissible and reasonable decision in view of the relevant
information and within a broad range of discretion.
The court can examine whether "the hospital's expertise was actually brought
into play" ' 5 in arriving at a decision concerning the prescribed course of
treatment and whether the therapy is one "which respectable professional
opinion regards as within the range of appropriate treatment alternatives." ' 6
Thus, treatment need be only appropriate, not necessarily the best possible.s" '
This standard is institutionally useful in that it relieves the court from at-
tempting to ascertain the "best" treatment which may be impossible and
allows doctors professional leeway in treating their patients. At the same
time, it protects the patient against gross psychiatric abuses, 0 which in
this regard the Council of the American Psychiatric Association has promul-
gated guidelines that may be helpful."0 '
Under Ohio law the statute itself contemplates that some guidance will
be available to the court. The statute provides that the Department of Mental
.103 Bazelon, supra note 290, at 743, 745.
304 379 F.2d 104, 105 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
305 Williams v. Robinson, 432 F.2d 637, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
306 Bazelon, supra note 290, at 745.
307 [Under this standard] what would a judge do if presented with a patient suffering
from endogenous depression who had been treated with trycyclic antidepressants . . .
but who now complains in court that he should have been given ECT [electro-convulsive
therapy]? ECT is approximately 80 percent effective in controlling the symptoms of
endogenous depression and it usually works within less than two :weeks, while trycyclic
compounds are estimated to be from 32 to 80 percent effective and usually take from
two to three weeks to work . . . . Since "the possibility of better treatment does not
necessarily prove that the one provided is unsuitable or inadequate," . . . [tihe court
could probably . . . justify the use of trycyclic antidepressants. Such a finding could
be buttressed by pointing out that: (1) ECT is more expensive than drugs; (2) ECT
engenders pain while the antidepressant drugs do not; and (3) ECT is often accom-
panied by side effects that are more severe than those accompanying drug therapy.
Prisoners and Mental Patients, supra note 294, at 652.
o08 For example, suppose that the depressed patient [in the above footnote] were, simply
provided psychotherapy. Since either ECT or drug therapy is the treatment of choice
for severe endogenous depression, this would seem to be a gross departure from sound
psychiatric techniques which the court would have little difficulty in ascertaining, and
would, therefore, breach the . . . standard.
Id.
309 Position Statement on the Question of Adequacy of Treatment, 123 AM. J. PSYCH.
1458 (1967).
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Health and Mental Retardation shall set standards for treatment, 1 ' and to
test whether these standards have been implemented or whether they are ade-
quate, the statute provides for an adversary hearing with expert testimony. 1'
Since the patient's counsel, the legal rights service, and an independent
medical expert of the patient's choice have access to the written treatment
plan,"1 2 both sides of the question should be fully developed, and any gross
departure from accepted standards should come to light.
The opportunity for judicial review of the adequacy of treatment arises
automatically at periodic intervals. At the end of the first ninety day com-
mitment period, a hearing must be held to justify further confinement if the
person has not already been discharged or has not admitted himself volun-
tarily. ' Further hearings are held at the end of each subsequent ninety day
period, unless waived, 1 ' and must be held at least every two years.3" At each
hearing the patient has a right to counsel and independent expert evaluation..
so that his interests will be fully represented. The patient's "diagnosis, prog-
nosis, past treatment, [and] a list of alternative settings and plans" are
reviewed at each hearing. 1 ' Thus, the patient may ask any questions he has
concerning the appropriateness of his treatment. Even if the patient does
not question his treatment, the certainty of review should be prophylactic
in that medical personnel will be encouraged to pay attention to their long-
term patients "rather than [to allow] them to exist indefinitely, with minimal
custodial care, virtually forgotten in the hospital's back wards."3' 18
The patient, however, need not wait until his next hearing date to
assert his right to treatment. Each patient is entitled to a "written list of
all rights enumerated in [the] chapter."31 He also has "[tihe right to
communicate freely with and be visited at reasonable times by his private
counsel or personnel of the legal rights service."330 The legal rights service
was created "to assure that all persons detained, hospitalized, discharged, or
810 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.27 (C) (Page Supp. 1976).
311 See text accompanying notes 110-43 supra.
312 01o REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.27 (B) (Page Supp. 1976).
BIB Id. § 5122.15 (H). If the person has become a voluntary patient, he must be released
upon his own request unless the head of the hospital instigates a probable cause hearing
or a commitment hearing. Id. § 5122.03 (B).
314 Id. § 5122.15 (H). This section of the statute may be amended to provide that subsequent
ninety-day hearings be held only upon the request of the patient. See Sub. H.B. No. 725(1977).
11 OnIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.15 (H) (Page Supp. 1976).
316 Id. § 5122.15 (A) (4).
3171 d. § 5122.15 (H).
BIB Strand, supra note 28, at 486.
319 OHO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.29 (A) (Page Supp. 1976).
320 ld. § 5122.29 (C).
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institutionalized.. . are fully informed of their rights and adequately repre-
sented by counsel ...in any proceedings to secure the rights of such per-
sons."
321
4. Remedies
In the event that the patient does not receive adequate treatment,
several remedies are available. First, if the head of the hospital determines
that treatment consistent with the treatment plan cannot be provided in
that facility and he is unable to effect transfer to a facility that can provide
such treatment, any involuntary commitment order is automatically term-
inated unless he has received an order of the court to the contrary.
22
Second, the patient has the right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 2
Although the statute does not specifically state that lack of adequate treatment
is a sufficient ground for the writ, it might be inferred from the statute's
guarantee of treatment. Courts in other jurisdictions which recognize the
right to treatment have indicated that the writ should issue when treatment
has not been forthcoming, at least where there is no other justification for
confining the person, such as dangerousness to himself or the community. 2'
Yet both of these remedies may be unsatisfactory in that while they may
effect the patient's freedom, they do not secure him treatment. Moreover,
the person who has exhibited dangerous behavior or who is unable to care
for himself probably will not be released.
A suit for damages may be a more effective remedy since the hospital
administrators will then suffer some penalty for neglecting a patient and
presumably will be more careful in the future. Limitations do exist, however,
on the personal liability of hospital personnel. Ohio law shields them from
liability when they act "reasonably and in good faith, either upon actual
knowledge or information thought by them to be reliable." ' The hospital
:321 1d. § 5123.94 (A).
322 Id. § 5122.27 (G). Upon the determination by the head of the hospital that treatment
cannot be provided, he must immediately notify the patient, the court, the legal rights
service, the chief of the Division of Mental Health, and the patient's counsel and legal
guardian. If the court is going to order continued confinement, despite the patient's in-
ability to secure adequate treatment, it must do so within ten days of the time the chief of
the Division of Mental Health receives such notification from the head of the hospital. Id.
323 Id. § 5122.30. This was true under the old statute also, as the only change made in
this section was the use of the word "person" rather than "individual." See OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 5122.30 (Page 1970).
324E.g., Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Nason v. Superintendent of
Bridgewater State Hospital, 353 Mass. 604, 233 N.E.2d 908 (1968); Application of D.D.,
118 N.J. Super. 1, 285 A.2d 283 (1971).
325 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.34 (Page Supp. 1976). Cf. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S.
308, 322 (1975), where the Supreme Court held that a school official is not immune from
liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) only if
he knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere
of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the student affected,
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corporation or the state itself,"' when a state institution is involved, may
be a more appropriate party to sue. In construing the New York mental
health statute, 2 which also proclaims a right to treatment, a New York
court held that a man who had been involuntarily confined in a New York
state hospital for thirty-seven years had a valid claim for damages against
the State of New York upon a showing that he had been detained amidst
indifference and neglect as to his treatment. 2
Most satisfactory may be a writ of mandamus to compel the hospital
administrator to provide the required treatment. The Ohio Revised Code
specifically provides that it is his duty to assure each patient treatment
consistent with the treatment plan,12 ' and the administrator of the legal
rights service has the authority to initiate actions in mandamus "when attempts
at administrative resolution prove unsatisfactory."3 0
B. A "Bill of Rights" for Mental Patients
Horror stories of abuse, degradation and regimentation in mental institu-
tions are not uncommon. Most people who are afraid of mental hospitals
believe that if one is not crazy before being confined, he certainly would be
afterwards. Such fear is not completely unfounded since deterioration may
result simply from confinement at an institution.
The mental patient exists within a completely controlled situation, in
which he loses all individual ability to make any decisions regarding his
own life. He is told when and where to sleep, eat, shower, defecate, and
he is forced to follow directives from all staff members ....
The usual result of hospital treatment of long-term patients is sometimes
referred to as "institutionalization," that process by which individuals
or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of con-
stitutional rights or other injury to the student.
This standard was subsequently applied to the mental health field. O'Connor v. Donaldson,
422 U.S. at 577.
326 After such recent decisions as Corbean v. Xenia City Bd. of Educ., 366 F.2d 480
(6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1041 (1967) (the federal Civil Rights Act has
not abrogated Ohio's doctrine of sovereign immunity) and Lehew v. Rhodes, 23 Ohio App.
2d 102, 261 N.E.2d 280 (1970) (doctrine of sovereign immunity still applied by Ohio
courts), the Ohio legislature finally enacted legislation whereby the state granted consent
to be sued "in accordance with the same rules of law applicable to suits between private
parties." Oro REv. CODE ANN. § 2743.02 (A) (Page Supp. 1976). The statute specifically
"waives the immunity from liability of all hospitals owned or operated by one or more
political subdivisions." Id. § 2743.02 (B).
327N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 15.03 (McKinney 1976).
328 Bartlett v. State, 52 App. Div. 2d 318, 383 N.Y.S.2d 763 (1976).
329 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.27 (C) (Page Supp. 1976).
330 Id. § 5123.94 (G). This statutory right is important because at least one court has held
that mandamus could not be issued to the superintendent of a hospital to compel him
to provide adequate treatment. Nason v. Commissioner of Mental Health, 351 Mass. 94,
98, 217 N.E.2d 733, 736 (1966).
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lose their ability to think or act for themselves, and become
completely dependent upon the institution .... Rather than providing
treatment enabling the disturbed patient to return and function in the
world outside the hospital, the hospital has the opposite effect."'
This process is exacerbated when the patient is confined not only to the
hospital but is further restricted with handcuffs, straitjackets, isolation or
excessive medication. 832
The legal consequences of commitment under prior law further limited
the ability of the person to act for himself. For example, an adjudication
of involuntary commitment carried with it an automatic determination of
incompetency.33 Since an incompetent cannot legally conduct his own
business affairs, his capacity to contract, devise, and otherwise convey
property and enter into agreements was also affected."' In addition, the
patient could be denied the right to write and receive uncensored mail and
to receive visitors if the hospital administrator deemed it "necessary for the
medical welfare of the patient," ' and the administrator could also take
possession of the patient's money and valuables.3 6 Other consequences have
been that the involuntarily committed person could lose his driver's
license,"3 have his professional license suspended by the body having
statutory authority to regulate the profession,"3 deprived of the right to
marry, to vote,4 0 to hold elective office, " ' and to serve on a jury.'
An even more devastating consequence was that his children could be put
up for adoption without his consent. '
Besides having lost significant civil rights, the mental patient in a state
hospital was often asked to perform menial labor for little or no pay in order
.131 Strand, supra note 28, at 484.
332 ROBITSCHER, supra note 19, at 135.
3 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2111.01 (D) (Page 1970) (amended 1976).
334 In re Fisher, 39 Ohio St. 2d at 80, 313 N.E.2d at 857.
335 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.29 (Page 1970) (amended 1976).
336 Id. § 5123.42.
$37 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 4507.08 (B) (Page 1973).
338 In re Fisher, 39 Ohio St. 2d at 80, 313 N.E.2d at 857. See OIO REV. CoDE ANN. §§
4723.28 (nurses), 4730.05 (C) (physician's assistants), 4731.22 (B) (16) (practice of
medicine), 4731.70 (F) (physical therapists), 4732.17 (I) (psychologists), 4734.11 (chiro-
practors), 4735.18 (GG) (realtors), 4739.06 (steam boiler operators), 4741.22 (P) (veteri-
narians), 4749.03 (A) (1) (private investigators) (Page 1977). Sub. H.B. No. 725 (1977)
would amend these sections to provide that suspension cannot occur unless the licensee has
been adjudicated incompetent for the purpose of practicing the profession.
3 39 0mo REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.06 (Page 1972).
340 Id. § 3503.18 (Page 1972).
341 Omo CONST. art. XV, § 4.
3420to REV. CODE ANN. § 2313.06 (Page 1954).
330mo REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.06 (B) (3) (Page 1972) (amended 1976).
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to contribute to the upkeep of the hospital." ' While many patients may
have performed their tasks willingly, because of lack of anything better to
do,3"' there was, nevertheless, an element of coercion behind such a request.
Privileges could be withdrawn for failure to perform the requested task." 6
Also, nonperformance could be interpreted as a lack of desire to become
well, which would mean longer confinement."' However, if the patient did
his assigned work well, the hospital might be tempted to keep him longer
than necessary, for he then helped "to solve the employment problem. '34 8
Other than the obvious problems which a forced labor situation creates, the
use of patient labor created the further problem of increasing rather than
diminishing the patient's dependency on the hospital, so that rather than
getting well, he learned only how to become a "good patient. -3 9
Such dehumanizing conditions, which are horrifying on the moral level,
seem to be sufficient reason for the Ohio legislature to enact legislation to
correct them. Yet, there is a more pragmatic reason why the legislature
should have concerned itself with these conditions existing at state mental
institutions. Each restriction on human freedom and autonomy increases
patient dependency on the hospital and therefore hinders recovery."' 0 A
recognition of increased patient liberties is an intrinsic part of enlightened
treatment programs that seek to restore dignity in patients, not just to
enable them to live more comfortably at the hospitals, but to prepare them
for responsible living outside the institution. To accomplish this the hospital
must seek to recreate the kind of living conditions found in the everyday
life of people at large. 5'
In order to ensure the best possible treatment, medical authorities have
advocated that each patient have specified rights and privileges. Among
these include the right to be addressed and regarded in the same respectful
344 Hospitals have needed this lowly paid patient labor in order to keep their expenses
within their budgetary limits. Civil Commitment, supra note 19, at 1372. Private hospitals
employ outside labor to perform the institutional chores that are done by the patients in
state hospitals. ROBITSCHER, supra 19, at 148.
45 See Wexler, Token and Taboo: Behavior Modification, Token Economies and the Law,
61 CALIF. L. REV. 81, 85 (1973).
346 Ferleger, Loosing the Chains: In-Hospital Civil Liberties of Mental Patients, 13 SANTA
CLARA LAW. 447, 449, 478-79 (1973); Friedman, The Mentally Handicapped Citizen and
Institutional Labor, 87 HARV. L. REV. 567, 580-81 (1974).
347 ROBITSCHER, supra note 19, at 148.
348Dewey, Civil Incompetency in Ohio: Determination and Effect, 34 U. GIN. L. REV.
419, 433 n.51 (1965).
349 Bartlett, Institutional Peonage: Our Exploitation of Mental Patients, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
July 1964 at 116.
350 Recall that the Wyatt court recognized that a humane psychological and physical environ-
ment was essential to adequate treatment. See note 300 and accompanying text supra.
-51 Morris, Institutionalizing the Rights of Mental Patients: Committing the Legislature, 62
CALIF. L. REV, 957, 965-66 (1974).
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manner as his healthy peers and to be clothed and groomed in such a way
as not to cause embarrassment to him. He should have the right to some
privacy for himself, to certain of his possessions, and to the time necessary
to develop and exercise his capacity for independent and responsible be-
havior. Finally, he should be allowed to maintain and nurture useful contacts
between himself and the other patients and members of the community so
that he can receive from these individuals sufficient reaction to his behavior,
thinking and feelings to enable him to have that information which is
necesary to develop a realistic self-appraisal."'
A patient should also have the right to be free from excessive medica-
tion. One cannot adapt to life in the outside world or to any kind of autono-
mous life if he is constantly in a drugged state. One example of drug abuse
that occurred in Ohio concerned the leader of a group of patients who were
protesting their transfer from an open to a closed ward. He was treated
with increased dosages of a tranquilizing medication, which caused him to
become so thick-tongued and fuzzy-minded that he was unable to continue
in his petitioning efforts. 3 ' In addition, excessive medication can often render
patients unable to conduct a rational defense at their commitment hearings.3 " '
If a person is expected eventually to resume responsible citizenship in
the community, he must have some practice in managing his own affairs.
The impaired judgment that accompanies commitment does not necessarily
prevent a person from properly managing his property or business affairs.
Moreover, any impairment that existed prior to hospitalization may be
alleviated in a short time by proper medical treatment.5
Another reason, less idealistic, for the Ohio legislature to accord mental
patients more rights and better living conditions is to qualify the state for
federal funding. When the Task Force appointed by Governor Gilligan
investigated conditions in the state institutions, it found that one of the prime
reasons for the then-prevailing low standard of care was underfunding355
Since Ohioans appear to be generally resistant to the idea of spending tax
dollars for personal services," ' an attractive way to acquire extra money is
the receipt of federal money. In line with this idea, the legislature created
352 Cameron, Nonmedical Judgment of Medical Matters, 57 GEO. L.J. 716, 732 (1969).
353 Strand, supra note 28, at 484.
354 "Often it is the drugs themselves which are responsible for 'crazy' behavior. Tranquili-
zers often give people a blank starey look and make them slow in responding to questions."
Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. at 1092 n.19, quoting Hearings on H.R. 12854 and S.
2869 Before the Senate Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights, 91st Cong., 1st. & 2d Sess. 426
(1969-1970).
s55 Dewey, supra note 348, at 425.
356 TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 5-4.
351 Ohio ranks 50th in per capita expenditures for personal services. Id. at 5-61.
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the Joint Mental Health and Mental Retardation Advisory and Review
Commission, one of the functions of the Commission being to "study federally
funded programs that could benefit mentally ill .. .persons, and report to
the department and the general assembly any executive or legislative actions
necessary to obtain federal support of state or local programs related to
mental health." ' As many patients in state mental hospitals are aged or
poor, a large financial gain to the state could be possible if at least part of
the expenses incurred by hospitalization were paid through Medicare."'
To be eligible for Medicare and Medicaid payments, the providers of health
services must comply with certain standards; 6 ° many of the patients' rights
in the new Act probably reflect a desire to comply with these requirements.
358 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5119.80 (D) (1) (Page Supp. 1976).
359 In 1972 three Ohio institutions had already lost medicare funds, and three more were in
danger of losing certification. Decertification would mean a loss of six to seven million
dollars annually to the state of Ohio. TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 5-64.
116 One set of conditions for participation includes patients' rights.
The governing body of the facility [must establish] written policies regarding the rights
and responsibilities of patients and, through the administrator, is responsible for develop-
ment of, and adherence to, procedures implementing such policies . . . .These patients'
rights policies and procedures [must] ensure that, at least, each patient admitted to
the facility:
(1) Is fully informed, as evidenced by the patient's written acknowledgment, prior to
or at the time of admission and during stay, of these rights and of all rules and
regulations governing patient conduct and responsibilities;
(3) Is fully informed, by a physician, of his medical condition unless medically
contraindicated (as documented, by a physician, in his medical record), and is
afforded the opportunity to participate in the planning of his medical treatment
and to refuse to participate in experimental research;
(5) Is encouraged and assisted, throughout his period of stay, to exercise his rights
as a patient and as a citizen .... ;
(6) May manage his personal financial affairs . ..
(7) Is free from mental and physical abuse, and free from chemical and [except
in emergencies] physical restraints except as authorized in writing by a physician
for a specified and limited period of time, or when necessary to protect the
patient from injury to himself or others;
(9) Is treated with consideration, respect, and full recognition of his dignity and
individuality;
(10) Is not required to perform services for the facility that are not included for thera-
peutic purposes in his plan of care;
(11) May associate and communicate privately with persons of his choice, and send
and receive his personal mail unopened, unless medically contraindicated [as docu-
mented by his physician in his medical record];
(13) May retain and use his personal clothing and possessions as space permits, unless
to do so would infringe upon rights of other patients, and unless medically con-
traindicated [as documented by his physician in his medical record]; and
(14) If married, is assured privacy for visits by his/her spouse; ...
20 C.F.R. § 405.1121 (k) (1976).
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In accordance with the ideas discussed above, the Ohio legislature
has enacted legislation that marks a significant step forward for the rights
of the mentally ill to human dignity, privacy and liberty. Section 5122.27
provides that all mental patients shall:
(F) Receive humane care and treatment including without limitation
the following:
(1) The least restrictive environment consistent with the treatment
plan;
(3) A humane psychological and physical environment within the
hospital facilities;
(4) The right to obtain current information concerning his treatment
program and expectations in terms that he can reasonably under-
stand;
(5) Participation in programs designed to afford him substantial op-
portunity to acquire skills to facilitate his return to the community;
(6) The right to be free from unnecessary or excessive medication;
(7) Freedom from restraints or isolation unless it is stated in a written
order by the head of the hospital or his designee, or the patient's
individual physician or psychologist in a private or general hospital.
Further rights are set out in Section 5122.29:
(B) The right at all times to be treated with consideration and respect
for his privacy and dignity, including without limitation, the following:
(1) At the time a person is taken into custody for diagnosis, detention,
or treatment . . . the person taking him into custody shall take
reasonable precautions to preserve and safeguard the personal
property in the possession of or on the premises occupied by that
person;
(2) A person who is committed, voluntarily or involuntarily, shall be
given reasonable protection from assault or battery by any other
person.
(C) The right to communicate freely with and be visited at reasonable
times by his private counsel or personnel of the legal rights service and
unless prior restriction has been obtained, to communicate freely with
and be visited at reasonable times by his physician or psychologist.
(D) The right to communicate freely with others, unless specifically
restricted in the patient's treatment plan for clear treatment reasons,
including without limitation the following:
(1) To receive visitors at reasonable times;
(2) To have reasonable access to telephones to make and receive con-
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fidential calls, including a reasonable number of free calls if unable
to pay for them and assistance in calling if requested and needed;
(E) The right to have ready access to letter writing materials, including
a reasonable number of stamps without cost if unable to pay for them,
and to mail and receive unopened correspondence and assistance in
writing if requested and needed.
(F) The right to the following personal privileges consistent with
health and safety:
(1) To wear his own clothes and maintain his own personal effects;
(2) To be provided an adequate allowance for or allotment of neat,
clean, and seasonable clothing if unable to provide his own;
(3) To maintain his personal appearance according to his own personal
taste, including head and body hair;
(4) To keep and use personal possessions, including toilet articles;
(5) To have access to individual storage space for his private use;
(6) To keep and spend a reasonable sum of his own money for expenses
and small purchases;
(7) To receive and possess reading materials without censorship, ex-
cept when the materials create a clear and present danger to the
safety of persons in the institutions.
(G) The right to reasonable privacy, including both periods of privacy
and places of privacy.
(H) The right to exercise all civil rights, including but not limited to
the rights to contract, hold professional, or occupational or vehicle
operator's licenses, marry, obtain a divorce, register, vote, make a will,
and sue and be sued, unless he has been adjudicated incompetent for
that purpose in a separate judicial proceeding.
(I) The right to free exercise of religious worship within the institution,
including a right to services and sacred texts that are within the reason-
able capacity of the institution to supply, provided that no patient shall
be coerced into engaging in any religious activities.
(J) The right to social interaction with members of either sex, subject
to adequate supervision, unless such social interaction is specifically
withheld under a patient's written treatment plan.
The statute also provides that "no patient . . . shall be compelled to
perform labor which involves the operation, support, or maintenance of the
hospital." '361 If a patient volunteers to perform such labor, he is to be compen-
sated according to the value of the work that he has performed. 6 ' A patient
361 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.28 (Page Supp. 1976).
362 Id. "Value" is to be determined by "the prevailing wage rate for comparable work or
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may, however, be required to perform other tasks if such tasks are therapeutic
in nature, 8 or he may "be required to perform tasks of a personal house-
keeping nature." 6 '
Protection is also extended to mental patients after they have received
treatment and have been discharged into the community by providing that
"[n]o person shall be deprived of any civil right or public or private employ-
ment solely by reason of his having received services, voluntarily or unvolun-
tarily, for a mental disability. '" 3 65 The legislature here has presumably recog-
nized the social stigma that is still associated with the commitment of the men-
tally ill. 66 However, a mere proclamation of non-discrimination may not be
sufficient to extend protection to the rights of the formerly mentally ill.""7
Discrimination in fact may be easy to cover up and difficult to prove. Yet
the statute at least prohibits such adverse decisions as Spencer v. Toussaint.8
where a United States District Court held that the City of Detroit could
deny a prospective employee a position as a city bus driver on the basis of
the applicant's history of mental illness.
It is noteworthy that the rights created are not later limited by making
them dependent on the judgment of the hospital personnel. The few re-
strictions that exist are subject to standards of "reasonableness" or "health
and safety," 6 ' terms which the courts are experienced in interpreting. The
by the wage rates established under Section 4111.06 of the Revised Code." Id. Section
4111.06 (Page 1973) (amended 1976) permits the director of industrial relations to issue
regulations providing for a lower wage scale to be applied to people "whose earning capacity
is impaired by physical or mental deficiencies or injuries."
363 Id. Some tasks may be assigned simply to avoid the boredom that accompanies life in
an institution. Wexler, supra note 345.
364 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.28 (Page Supp. 1976).
3
65 Id. § 5122.301 (Page Supp. 1976).
S66 Recall that Thomas Eagleton resigned under pressure as the Democratic nominee for the
Vice-Presidency when it was discovered that he had received electro-convulsive therapy
for treatment of depression many years earlier. A University of Kentucky researcher dis-
covered that mental illness ranks 21st in the social acceptability of various handicaps, be-
hind such disabilities as amputation, paralysis, epilepsy, alcoholism, and even prior criminal
conviction. Interestingly enough, an ulcer, which may represent a somatic reaction to
stress and tension, was the most socially acceptable. Is Mental Illness Acceptable? Mental
Health Association of Stark County Bellringer, Feb. 1977, at 2. And in Hearings before the
Senate Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1969-1970) (testi-
mony of Bruce Ennis) it was related that "in the job market, it is better to be an ex-felon
than ex-patient."
367 Ennis suggests that those who were mentally ill in the past will be sufficiently protected
only if employers are forbidden by statute to ask a job applicant if he has ever been hospital-
ized or treated for mental illness. Ennis, Civil Liberties and Mental Illness, 7 CRIM. L.
BULL. 101, 123-24 (1971).
368 408 F. Supp. 1067 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
369 Under the prior statute patients held rights-which included only the rights to communi-
cate by sealed letter and to receive visitors-"subject to the determination of the head of the
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most discretionary standard appears in Section 5122.29 (D), where the
right to communicate freely with others may be abridged "for clear treatment
reasons." Even here, however, there are curbs on arbitrariness. The restric-
tions and the reasons therefor are to be delineated in the treatment plan,
which means they are subject to periodic judicial review. Moreover, the
patient still has the right to write and receive uncensored mail;.7 he also
has the unrestricted right to communicate freely with his private counsel
or personnel of the legal rights service." He therefore may be expected to
complain if he believes that his right to communicate freely has been unduly
restricted.
Other rights may be restricted by court order, including the right "to
communicate freely with and be visited at reasonable times by his personal
physician or psychologist" '72 and "the right to exercise ... civil rights" when
"adjudicated incompetent for that purpose." ' "Incompetency" means the
"inability [to take] proper care of himself or his property or [failure] to
provide for his family or other persons for whom he is charged by law to
provide." ' The person alleging incompetency must show that the patient
has a mental disorder which causes bad judgment so that he squanders his
money, is easily victimized by those who would take advantage of him, or
so hoards his assets as to deprive himself or his family of necessities.7
Although the bad judgment must be caused by a mental disorder rather than
by ignorance or inexperience,7 ' a simple finding of mental illness is in-
sufficient." Incompetency is a pragmatic concept; a person may be compe-
tent to handle a small monthly income, yet incompetent to manage a large
hospital that it is necessary to impose restrictions." OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.29
(Page 1970) (amended 1976). Thus, the rights under the new statute are not only more
numerous, they are also more secure. The Ohio legislature is to be commended for its
strong stance on patients' rights. Compare CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326 (West Supp.
1977) ("The professional person in charge of the facility or his designee may, for good
cause, deny a person any of the rights under the previous section . . . . To ensure that
these rights are denied only for good cause, the Director of Health shall adopt regulations
specifying the conditions under which they may be denied."); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
123 § 23 (West Supp. 1976-77) ("any of these rights may be denied for good cause by
the superintendent or his designee and a statement of the reasons for any such denial
entered in the treatment record of such person").
370 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.29 (E) (Page Supp. 1976).
371 Id. § 5122.29 (C).
372 Id.
873 Id. § 5122.29 (H). It is noteworthy that a determination of incompetency does not
follow automatically upon civil commitment, as it did under the old statute. See text ac-
companying notes 333 and 334 supra.
374 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2111.01 (D) (Page 1970) (amended 1976).
375 Davidson, An Appraisal of Competency, 9 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 441 (1960).
376 Id.
Si7 In re Pickles, 170 So. 2d 603, 614 (Fla. 1965).
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inheritance or the proceeds from the sale of his home.378 Moreover, a determ-
ination of incompetency applies only to the particular type of transaction
adjudicated, so that a person who has been found incapable of assenting
to a contract may still be found capable of making a will. 7 Since an adjudi-
cation of incompetency is a partial deprivation of liberty, borderline cases
should be given the benefit of the doubt." °
Much potential for abuse also exists in a proceeding to determine
incompetency. The statutes do not specify any particular procedure to be
followed at the hearing; 1 it is ex parte in nature, 82 and there is no require-
ment that the alleged incompetent be present at the hearing or that someone
be appointed to represent him. 83 Unless these defects are remedied by a
revision of the law concerning guardianship,384 it can only be hoped that
the legal rights service, which is supposed to insure that patients are at least
represented by counsel in any proceedings to secure the rights of patients, 85
will help to curb unnecessary deprivation of legal capacity.
The statute makes provision for enforcement of the rights guaranteed
to mental patients. The Joint Mental Health and Mental Retardation Ad-
visory and Review Commission is to "receive and evaluate reports of alleged
-38 Davidson, supra note 375, at 442. Medically speaking, incompetency does not depend
on how much money can be squandered or hoarded. It is just as "crazy" to believe erron-
eously that you have one dollar in your pocket as it is to believe you have a million
dollars. But legally it makes sense to base a judgment on the amount of money involved.
It requires more expertise to handle a large sum of money than it does a small sum;
moreover, incompetency proceedings cost money, and so may be impracticable when the
stakes are small. Id.
379E.g., to be legally competent to make a deed or enter a contract, one must be capable
of assent, which requires a "sound mind possessed of memory, will, and understanding."
Lore v. Truman, 1 Dec. Rep. 510, 514 (1852), rev'd on other grounds, 10 Ohio St. 45
(1859) and 14 Ohio St. 144 (1862). But capacity to marry depends on cognizance of the
nature and obligations of the marriage contract at the time it is entered into. Fisher v.
Adams, 151 Neb. 512, 38 N.W.2d 337 (1949). And "[a] testator with mind enough to under-
stand the ordinary affairs of life, the kind and extent of his property, who are the natural
objects of his bounty, and that he is giving his property to the persons mentioned in his will,
in the manner therein stated, is capable of making a will." Hardy v. Barbour, 304 S.W.2d
21, 34 (Mo. 1957).
In recognition of this principle of selective incompetency the Ohio statute provides that
the right to exercise all civil rights continues unless the person "has been adjudicated in-
competent for that purpose in a separate judicial proceeding." OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 5122.29 (H) (Page Supp. 1976) (emphasis added).
380 In re Pickles, 170 So. 2d at 614.
381 See Dewey, supra note 89, at 434.
382 State ex rel. Davey v. Owen, 133 Ohio St. 96, 103, 12 N.E.2d 144, 148 (1937).
883 See Dewey, supra note 89, at 434.
.384 The Ohio Judicial Conference has indicated that it will be discussing the issue of guard-
ianship as a separate matter and will be making recommendations to the General Assembly
at a later time. Memorandum on Ohio Judicial Conference meeting relative to H.B. No. 244,
from Nancy Daniels to Senator Tim McCormack and Representative Paul Leonard (Dec.
16, 1976) at 2.
385 mo REv. CODE ANN. § 5123.94 (A) (Page Supp. 1976).
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dehumanizing practices and violations of individual or other legal rights."3 6
If attempts at resolution of complaints through administrative channels prove
unsatisfactory, the administrator of the legal rights service may "initiate
actions in mandamus and such other legal and equitable remedies as may be
necessary to accomplish the purposes of [the Mental Health Act] .
C. Treatment in the Least Restrictive Environment
The Ohio legislature may have been prompted to enact the "least
restrictive alternative" provisions of the Mental Health Act for at least three
reasons. The first is that it may be constitutionally required. The concept,
previously invoked to restrict state attempts to regulate commerce38 and
free speech,3"9 requires government, in its attempts to restrict undesirable
conduct, to use those means which are least likely to inhibit protected be-
havior.39 ° One of the more articulate statements of the concept appears in
Shelton v. Tucker, 91 where the Supreme Court of the United States said that:
[E] yen though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial,
that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle funda-
mental personal liberties when the end can be narrowly achieved. The
breadth of the . . . abridgement must be viewed in the light of less
drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose. 92
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia was the first to
apply the doctrine to a modern case involving civil commitment. " In
Lake v. Cameron,"4 the court used the doctrine to construe the "least restric-
tive alternative" provision in the District of Columbia Code and held that a
court must satisfy itself that the deprivation of liberty does not exceed what
is necessary for a patient's protection. 95 If other less restrictive means of
treatment are available which would provide the mentally ill person with
sufficient care, they should be used instead of committing the person to an
institution.396 This court also has applied this theory to a case involving
38° id. § 5119.801 (G).
8 71 Id. § 5123.94 (G).
88 See Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
38
9 See Soia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
390 Wormuth & Mirkin, The Doctrine of the Reasonable Alternative, 9 UTAH L.J. 254, 256
(1964); see 7 CRIM. L. BULL. 101, 112-13 (1971).
391 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
392 Id. at 488 (footnote omitted).
393 See In re Oakes, 8 Law Rep. 123 (Mass. 1845).
394 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
395 Id. at 660.
396 Id. In examining the choice of environment, the reviewing court is not to determine if
the best possible choice was made. Instead, the court is to determine whether the decision
made, in view of all relevant information, constituted a reasonable and permissible one.
Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 621 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Hospital personnel are to be
given broad discretion in making such decisions. Id.
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confinement in a maximum security ward after commitment."9 '
In Lessard v. Schmidt, 9 ' a similar case, the court, independent of any
statute as in Lake, said that those advocating commitment "must bear the
burden of proving (1) what alternatives are available; (2) what alternatives
were investigated; and (3) why the investigated alternatives were not deemed
suitable."3"' Possible "alternatives include . . . out-patient treatment, day
treatment in a hospital, night treatment in a hospital, placement in the custody
of a friend or relative, placement in a nursing home, referral to a community
mental health clinic, and home health aid services." ' Commitment should
result only when these alternatives are not feasible. The Lessard opinion
may well have been very influential to the Ohio legislature because the Ohio
Supreme Court has given its general approval to the decision."'
The second factor which may have prompted the Ohio legislature
to enact this particular part of the statute is that minimal restriction serves
the purpose of creating a more pleasant environment and increases the
effectiveness of treatment programs. For instance, conditions at a Pennsyl-
vania state hospital changed rapidly after operating for two years as a
completely open hospital.
The discharge rate of patients had doubled, and thanks to the zooming
discharge rate, the hospital population had been reduced in the face
of a doubled monthly admission rate. The relapse rate was cut almost
in half. There was a sharp drop in violence. Patients got along better
with themselves and the staff. Staff morale was raised tremendously.
Property damage by patients was reduced by 75 percent.
There had not been a single serious incident in the surrounding com-
munity involving a patient. There were no more escapes than before
the doors were opened. Patients were expected to act like human beings,
and acted like human beings. 02
397 Id. In Covington the court stated that, "[I]n reviewing . . . a . . . committed patient's
confinement . . . the court should satisfy itself that no less onerous disposition would serve
the purpose of commitment." Id. at 623. The court justified its review of in-house opera-
tions on the ground that "[iut makes little sense to guard zealously against the unwarranted
deprivations [of liberty] prior to hospitalization, only to abandon the watch once the patient
disappears behind hospital doors." Id. at 623-24.
398 349 F. Supp. 1078. The Court reached this result without the aid of a helpful statute
requiring treatment to be accomplished in the least restrictive manner. It did note, however,
that the Wisconsin statutes, which provided that "the court 'may . . . (c) Order him com-
mitted if satisfied that he is mentally ill . . . and that he is a proper subject for custody
and treatment...' and shall commit the person to a hospital 'if the court or jury finds
that the patient is mentally ill or infirm and should be sent to a hospital for the mentally
ill or infirm,'" did not conflict with its mandate. Id. at 1096.
3991d. at 1096.
400 Id.
401 In re Fisher, 39 Ohio St. 2d at 71, 313 N.E.2d at 851, 856.
402 Hearings on the Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill Before the Subcomm. on Con-
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A third consideration which also may have motivated the legislature to
stress treatment in less restrictive environments is the availability of potential
federal funds to further lessen the cost of treatment. The Community Mental
Health Centers Act..3 is specifically directed at the provision of local com-
munity services in the mental health field. To be eligible for federal funding,
states must adopt an approved plan whereby comprehensive services are
provided. ° Such services are to include:
(A) inpatient services, outpatient services, day care and other partial
hospitalization services, and emergency services;
(F) provision of followup care for residents of its catchment area who
have been discharged from a mental health facility;
(G) a program of transitional half-way house services for mentally ill
individuals . . . who have been discharged from a mental health
facility or would without such services require inpatient care in such
a facility; . . .05
The plan is to "emphasize the provision of outpatient services by community
mental health centers as a preferable alternative to inpatient hospital ser-
vices." ' 6 That the Ohio legislature may have contemplated obtaining federal
funding is evidenced by the fact that the statute requires the Mental Health
Commission to study federally funded programs that could benefit the
mentally ill '07 and to "review and assess the administration and availability
of mental health . . . programs and facilities in the state." ' 8
The Ohio statute creates a right to receive treatment in "the least
restrictive environment consistent with the treatment plan." ' 9 Determination
of the least restrictive environment is not left solely to the discretion of
hospital personnel. At the original commitment hearing, the designee of the
director or of the head of the hospital is to present "the diagnosis, prog-
nosis, record of treatment, if any, and less restrictive treatment plans, if
any 4 1 0 to the court. "In determining the place to which or the person with
stitutional Rights, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., Part I at 40
(1961) (testimony of Albert Deutsch).
403 42 U.S.C. §§ 2689-2689aa (Supp V 1975).
404 Id. § 2689t (a) (2).
405Id. § 2689 (b) (1).
406 Id. § 2689t (a) (2) (D).
407 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5119.801 (D) (1) (Page Supp. 1976).
4 08Id. § 5119.801 (D) (2).
409 id. § 5122.27 (F) (1). Restraint, of course, may be accomplished without the use of a
physical apparatus, but the statute also provides that the patient has "[t]he right to be free
from unnecessary or excessive medication." Id. § 5122.27 (F) (6).
410 Id. § 5122.15 (A) (10).
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whom, the [mentally ill person] is to be committed, the court shall consider
the diagnosis, prognosis and projected treatment plan . . . and order the
implementation of the least restrictive alternative available and consistent
with treatment goals." 1 ' At subsequent hearings on continued commitment,
"a list of alternative treatment settings and plans, and identification of the
treatment setting that is the least restrictive consistent with treatment
needs" '12 is to be presented for consideration. The doctrine probably also
applies during the treatment intervals. 1 '
However, substantial consideration of least restrictive settings will not
benefit the mental patient if no less confining facilities are available. For
example, in Lake v. Cameron," ' the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals ordered the district court to inquire into the possibility of alterna-
tive courses of treatment for a senile woman who had been placed in a
locked ward because she had a propensity to wander around on the streets
alone at night. On remand, the district court found that the woman was in
need of constant supervision for her own safety and that the only facility
in the area which could provide for her needs was the closed ward at
St. Elizabeth's Hospital. ' Yet, where there is a statutory right to less
restrictive appropriate facilities, the responsible authorities may be obli-
gated to create such facilities if they do not presently exist.,1 6
Accordingly, the Mental Health Act created a Joint Mental Health
and Mental Retardation Advisory and Review Commission.. whose duties
include, inter alia, the development of programs with "provisions for com-
munity-based alternatives to institutional care, for the availability of services
in the least restrictive environment consistent with the individual's needs,
and for comprehensive community services for the mentally ill, mentally
retarded, and developmentally disabled." ' 8 The Commission also is to submit
411 Id. § 5122.15 (E).
412 Id. § 5122.15 (H).
413 See, e.g., Dixon v. Weinberger, 405 F. Supp. 974, 980 (D.D.C. 1975).
414 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
"5 267 F. Supp. 155, 159 (D.D.C. 1967).
416 Dixon v. Weinberger, 405 F. Supp. 974, 979 (D.D.C. 1975). Litigation on the right to
placement in a facility close to other family members as part of a right to habilitation in
the least restrictive environment is currently being conducted in Ohio. Bettencourt v. Rhodes,
No. C77-12 (N.D. Ohio, filed Jan. 12, 1977). For a summary of the complaint, see I
MENTAL DISABiLiTY L. REP. 343 (1977).
41 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5119.80 (Page Supp. 1976). The Commission consists of
thirteen members and three ex officio members. It is interesting to note that at least seven
of the members must be nonproviders of mental health or mental retardation services. Two
of the members are to come from the legislature, one from the Senate and one from the
House of Representatives. The director of the legal rights service is to be one of the ex
officio members. The broad spectrum of viewpoints to be represented is in accord with the
idea that mental health care involves moral and legal problems as well as medical judgments.
418 Oio REv. CODE ANN. § 5119.801 (B) (Page Supp. 1976).
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a plan to the General Assembly "for phasing out as many long-term resi-
dential institutions and facilities as is possible." '19
The medical and legal concern for treatment in the least restrictive
environment has made a difference. Ohio communities are in fact developing
a wide array of services which enable many of the mentally ill to live safely
outside of an institution. Stark County is presented here as an example-
not because that county is necessarily representative of all other counties
in the state, but because this illustration indicates that it is desirable to
discover what is available in a particular client's locality so that hospitaliza-
tion may be avoided. In Stark County, outpatient programs include several
groups devoted to the rehabilitation of alcoholics and those addicted to
narcotics. The Developmental Disabilities Advocacy Program assigns the
disabled a personal "advocate" to help integrate the person into the community
via socialization and friendship. Also available are numerous counseling
services such as Recovery, Inc., which provides training in techniques for
self-help for former mental patients to help prevent relapses, the Crisis
Intervention Center which operates a 24-hour telephone service to provide
early intervention in crisis situations, and the Bureau of Vocational Re-
habilitation which seeks to enable those with a physical or mental disability
to enter or re-enter employment suitable to their abilities and limitations." "
Stark County also has three mental health centers designed to rehabili-
tate or to continue a rehabilitation program for those clients who have been
referred to them or voluntarily come to the centers. The centers are staffed
by consulting psychiatrists, social workers, psychologists, and psychiatric
nurses.' 2 1 The clinics are under-staffed, however, which is evidenced by the
fact that they are a few months behind schedule in appointments and the
psychiatrists have little time to administer anything but chemotherapy.'
The Director of Mental Health for Stark County believes that the most
innovative program in Stark County is a new district services agency called
Transitional Services. The agency primarily serves people who have been
previously hospitalized at Massillon State Hospital. Its purpose is to prevent
discharged patients "from returning to the hospital out of frustration ex-
perienced within the community because of inadequate services and case
management.' ' 2  Transitional Services provides assistance to persons "with
419 Id. § 5119.801 (I).
420 Stark County Human Services Directory (1976), passim.
421 Letter from Charles W. Harris, Executive Director of the Mental Health Asociation of
Stark County, to Janice Gui (Feb. 23, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Harris].
422 Id.
423 Transitional Services, Mental Health Association of Stark County Bellringer, Oct. 1976,
at 2.
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a diagnosed or, at least, suspected mental disorder, who need assistance
with various needs such as housing, clothing, food, employment, governmen-
tal assistance programs or other such related needs which will contribute to
their sucessful coping with community existence." ' One case history provides
an example of the comprehensive service that Transitional Services offers.
When a 32-year-old divorced female was referred to the agency upon her
release from the hospital, it was learned that
[The woman] had no income, no relatives with whom she could live,
no funds to pay for medication prescribed for her, no transportation
and was in need of counseling as well as psychiatric care. The Transi-
tional Services worker, with her approval, secured a room in a boarding
home for her, assisted her file for Adult Emergency Assistance, food
stamps and general relief, got her prescriptions filled, made the appro-
priate referrals to a mental health center where she would be seen by
a counselor and psychiatrist and be placed in the adult day care center
program. The Transitional Services worker also transported her from
the hospital to her new residence as well as . . . to her weekly physicians
[sic] appointments for the next two months.
Later the Transitional Services worker also arranged for legal aid
representation, and assisted her to find employment in order to go off
welfare and to be able to support herself.
Furthermore, since [she] was an excellent student in high school,
the Transitional Services worker referred her to the Bureau of Vocational
Rehabilitation whereupon they tested her and agreed to send her to
college.
• . .Transitional Services has [also] worked with her providing
close follow-up and crisis intervention in the early hours of the morning
[when she has had an 'inexplicable urge' to commit suicide] .425
The main need in Stark County at the present time is the establishment
of halfway houses to provide a mixture of guidance and freedom for dis-
charged mental patients. Such homes can enable the mentally rehabilitated
to "begin to 'normalize' their lives after perhaps many years of institutionali-
zation."42'
424 Agreement between the Mental Health Association of Stark County and the Eastern
Stark County Mental Health Foundation. The Eastern Stark County Mental Health Founda-
tion is one of the six agencies in Stark County that contracted with the Mental Health
Association to provide Transitional Services.
425 A Case History, Mental Health Association of Stark County Bellringer, Feb. 1977, at 3-4.
426 Harris, supra note 421. One problem that may arise with the establishment of such
homes is that they may run afoul of local zoning ordinances. Because such facilities are
usually inhabited by unrelated individuals, they may violate single-family use restrictions.
This presents a problem in that absorption of the mentally restored into the community
requires that they be placed within ordinary neighborhoods rather than into business
districts or rurally isolated areas. Id.
If there is legislation authorizing the establishment of such homes, it may be held to
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It is important for the practicing lawyer to be aware of facilities that
the community has to offer. Perhaps a court may be persuaded to release a
patient if a reasonable alternative plan for treatment is presented. In some
cases a residential change or even marital separation may be an effective
way to deal with psychological problems, " 7 but in many cases some outside
help for the disturbed person is desirable.
It should not be overlooked that treatment in a less confining environ-
ment poses risks, both to the public and to the patient himself. Various
studies concerning the risk to the public lead to conflicting conclusions. "
Those who favor less restriction resolve the conflict by giving the value of
human freedom greater weight than the safety of the public. They point to
the fact that in a democratic social organization the government must "take
chances with respect to what its citizens might do. Such a government cannot
strive for the maximum safety in order to maintain the values of liberty and
dignity." 2' The government does in fact take such chances with those
override any local zoning ordinances that would bar the homes from residential neighbor-
hoods. See Berger v. State, 71 N.J. 206, 218-19, 364 A.2d 993, 999-1000 (1976); Group
House of Port Washington, Inc. v. Board of Zoning and Appeals, 82 Misc. 2d 634, 370
N.Y.S.2d 433 (1976). Some states have enacted legislation that provides that such homes
are to be single-family residences for zoning purposes, thus eliminating the need for judi-
cial law on the subject. For example, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 462.357, subdiv. 7-8 (West
Supp. 1977) provides that a state licensed group for six or fewer mentally retarded or
physically handicapped individuals is to be considered a single-family residence for zoning
purposes; group homes for seven to sixteen mentally retarded or physically handicapped
people are to be considered multi-family residences. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 11-2702.1,
11-2702.2 (Supp. 1975) exempts community residential facilities for the developmentally
disabled serving eight or fewer residents from local single-family zoning requirements; the
statute was upheld by the Supreme Court of Montana. State ex rel. Thelen v. City of
Missoula, 543 P.2d 173 (Mont. 1975).
In the absence of such legislation, a court may rule that such a group of protected in-
dividuals constitutes a "family" for zoning purposes. Kline v. Dep't of Mental Hygiene,
No. 76-C-661 (E.D.N.Y. May 11, 1976), summarized in 1 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP.
127 (1976) (a state may not deny aftercare services to residents of a particular community
on the basis of local objections to the presence of former mental patients in the area);
Berger v. State, 71 N.J. at 224, 364 A.2d at 1002 (definition of family which "so narrowly
delimits the persons who may occupy a single family dwelling as to prohibit numberous
potential occupants who pose no threat to the style of family living sought to be preserved"
held to be unreasonable) (alternative holding); Little Neck Community Ass'n v. Working
Org'n for Retarded Children, 52 App. Div. 2d 90, 383 N.Y.S.2d 364, 367 (1976) (group
home established pursuant to statute is designed to resemble reasonably sized biological
family).
427 Strand, supra note 28, at 485.
428 Compare Overholser, The Present Status of the Problems of Release of Patients From
Mental Hospitals, excerpted in R. ALLEN, E. FERSTER & J. RUBIN, READINGS IN LAW AND
PSYCHIATRY 218, 219 (1968) ("popular fears of violence or other serious antisocial be-
havior on the part of persons who have been in a state hospital are generally unfounded")
with Rappeport & Lassen, Dangerousness: Arrest Rate Comparisons of Discharged Patients
and the General Population, id. at 221 ("for some offenses such as robbery and also
probably rape, [former] patients were more frequently arrested than the general population").
429 Civil Liberties, supra note 28, at 411.
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citizens who have criminal tendencies; even "if a sociologist predicted
that a person was eighty percent likely to commit a felonious act, no law
would permit his confinement." ' 30 There appears to be no rational basis
for treating the mentally ill any differently. '31
Insofar as the patient himself is concerned, it is known that some
suicidal patients do harm themselves even while undergoing treatment. One
example involves a man who was admitted to an open ward, despite his
wife's warnings of suicidal tendencies. Four days after he had been admitted,
he jumped into a window well thirteen feet deep. Although he survived,
he suffered such severe injuries that eight months later he was confined to
a nursing home, "completely disabled both mentally and physically and
required constant nursing attendance." '32 That the "least restrictive alterna-
tive" theory resulted in tragedy both to this patient and his family cannot
be denied. Such tragedy can be justified only by a superseding value-the
desirability of giving all mental patients the most effective treatment, which
will hopefully lead to cure and release.
Calculated risks of necessity must be taken if the modern and enlight-
ened treatment of the mentally ill is to be pursued intelligently and
rationally .... "I
Treatment requires the restoration of confidence in the patient.
This in turn requires that restrictions be kept at a minimum. Risks
must be taken or the case left as hopeless . . . . The standard of care
which stresses close observation, restriction and restraint has fallen in
disrepute in modern hospitals and this policy is being reversed with
excellent results.4 3'
Even if risks to the patient and the public are carefully evaluated,
and it is found that a less restrictive environment would probably provide
more benefits than risks of harm, the enthusiasm for less restrictive care in
community centers must be tempered with a realistic appraisal of the facilities
involved. It is essential to insure that alternative treatment facilities do in
fact provide adequate care. No benefits are gained by transferring patients
to a "community home" where they receive inadequate nutrition, insufficient
protection from violence, no attention to medicinal or treatment needs, and
physical restrictions as severe as those that would be encountered in a state
institution. There is no virtue in moving patients to an environment that
430 Comment, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 79 HARuv. L. REv. 1288, 1290 (1966).
431 Civil Liberties, supra note 28, at 411.
432 Baker v. United States, 226 F. Supp. 129, 131 (S.D. Iowa 1964).
433 Id. at 134-35.
434 Id. at 132-35.
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does not provide an improvement in living conditions nor foster a better
psychological attitude in patients. '35
D. The Right to Refuse Treatment
Although a right to psychiatric treatment, at least for those involun-
tarily committed, has generally been favored as a humanitarian ideal in both
medical and legal circles, it may be a mixed blessing. Thomas Szasz, a
psychiatrist who is opposed to any form of involuntary commitment, says:
The idea of a "right to mental treatment" is both naive and dangerous.
It is naive because it accepts the problem of the publicly hospitalized
mental patient as medical rather than educational, economic, religious
and social. It is dangerous because the remedy creates another problem:
compulsory medical treatment. For in a context of involuntary con-
finement, the treatment too shall have to be compulsory." '
Under the Donaldson standard, confinement on the ground of mental illness
alone is unconstitutional. ' If a patient is not dangerous, and the asserted
reason for his confinement is the benefit that he is expected to receive from
therapy, any justification for the confinement vanishes if he is in fact not
treated. This result would seem to follow regardless of whether the reason
for non-treatment is the state's refusal to provide such treatment or the
patient's refusal to accept it." 8
Forced treatment has occurred in cases involving physical illness. For
example, in Application of President and Directors of Georgetown College,
Inc., 3 9 a critically ill woman and her husband refused to give consent to a
blood transfusion necessary to preserve the woman's life. As a result, the
court issued an order requiring the transfusion, its rationale being that in a
case where a citizen appears to be in extreme danger, the state may intercede
4.15 D. MARTINDALE & E. MARTINDALE, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW: THE CRUSADE AGAINST
INVOLUNTARY HOSPITALIZATION 152-53 (1973); Civil Commitment, supra note 19, at 1404.
436 T. SzAsz, LAW, LIBERTY AND PSYCHIATRY 215 (1963).
417 422 U.S. at 573. The problem vanishes when there is voluntary commitment. Then, of
course, the patient is free to leave when he pleases so there is no confinement and hence
no need to justify it. A voluntarily committed patient may, however, be released if he re-
fuses treatment. Ortega v. Rasor, 291 F. Supp. 748 (S.D. Fla. 1968). Sub. H.B. No. 725
would amend OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.02 (C) (Page Supp. 1976) to provide that
the head of the hospital "may discharge any voluntary patient who refused to accept treat-
ment consistent with the written treatment plan required by section 5122.27 of the Revised
Code." Ohio judges and hospital personnel have complained that "some voluntary patients
refuse treatment and just take up space." Memorandum, supra note 127, at 2.
438 But see Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. at 666, where the Supreme Court said, in dicta,
that "[a] State might determine that the general health and welfare require that the victims
of [mental illness] be dealt with by compulsory treatment, involving . . . confinement or
sequestration."
, " 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
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and act in a manner contrary to the individual's desires or beliefs. "' The
court noted also that the state has a strong interest in preserving the life of
a mother. 4 '1 Cases such as this, however, do not state the general rule; they
rest on the emergency exception to the tort doctrine that unauthorized medical
treatment is a battery which gives rise to damages." 2
The question of a right to refuse mental treatment first was faced
squarely by a court in Winters v. Miller."' In Winters, the trial court found
that the state has both a duty to treat and the power to enforce the duty to
treat. Also, the court found a substantial state interest in treating the mentally
ill.
[A] mental patient, because of the nature of the illness, may be unable
either to seek appropriate treatment or to determine what treatment
to allow . . . . [W]here the mental patient is not properly treated,
the condition may progressively worsen, and the patient may become
a public burden and expense . . . .Where the proposed treatment is
conducive or necessary for the cure or amelioration of mental illness,
the failure to provide it would be a step backward in the history of
mental hygiene."'
The Court of Appeals took a different view of the issues raised in Winters.""'
The court held that the patient's religious convictions which had led to her
refusal to accept treatment outweighed the state's interest in compelling
treatment for one committed on an emergency basis. The holding was limited
though, in that no attempt at civil commitment had been made, so that the
state was not fully in the parens patriae relationship; the question was left
open as to whether a person who had been committed could be treated
against his will.
Since Winters, the issue has arisen in two federal cases, both involving
coerced treatment of the criminally insane. Both courts reached the conclu-
sion that the plaintiffs had alleged sufficient facts to state a claim under
the Civil Rights Act. In Souder v. McGuire the court stated that the
involuntary administration of psychotropic drugs could amount to cruel
and unusual punishment and could also be an "unwarranted governmental
intrusion into the patient's thought processes in violation of his constitutional
right to privacy."'4 6 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals recognized these
440 Id. at 1008.
441 Id.
442 See note 59, part I, supra.
,,8 306 F. Supp. 1158 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
"' Id. at 1167.
445 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1971).
4'6 423 F. Supp. 830, 832 (M.D. Pa. 1976).
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grounds for relief and indicated that a claim could also be grounded on a
violation of due process.47 or an invasion of bodily privacy."4 '
There are good reasons to recognize a right to refuse unwanted mental
treatment. First of all, any treatment carries risks of undesirable side effects. " '
When the treatment is performed to alleviate symptoms of mental, rather
than physical, illness, the problem becomes even more acute; not only are
there risks of physical disabilities,4" but there is also interference with human
autonomy. Even the administration of drugs, one of the least intrusive and
least controversial forms of therapy, interferes with actions that a person
would take "of his own free will." For instance, when a person attempts
to organize patients to petition for transfer into an open ward is drugged
to an extent which renders him unable to carry out his intentions, an act that
he would normally have performed has been prevented. Stronger and longer
lasting interference with natural behavior occurs when more radical treat-
ment is used, such as the use of aversive stimuli and psycho-surgery.4 '
Even if the interference with human autonomy can be justified on the
ground that the treatment elicits conforming behavior from the patient, it is
questionable whether the patient has been "cured." The use of aversive
447 Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939, 946 (3d Cir. 1976).
448 Id. at 946 n.9. For a full discussion of the possible constitutional bases underlying a
right to refuse treatment, see Schwartz, In the Name of Treatment: Autonomy, Civil Com-
mitment and the Right to Refuse Treatment, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 808 (1975); Comment,
Advances in Mental Health: A Case for the Right to Refuse Treatment, 48 TEMP. L.Q. 354
(1975).
" 9See, e.g., Kaiser v. Suburban Transportation System, 65 Wash. 2d 461, 398 P.2d 14
(1965). There, a doctor had prescribed an anti-histamine for a bus driver who had a nasal
condition. The first day that he took the pills he fell asleep or blacked out while he was
driving the bus. When sued by an injured passenger, the bus company defended on the
ground that the doctor had failed to warn him that drowsiness was a possible side-effect.
The court held that there was enough evidence for the jury to find that the physician's
negligence was the proximate cause of the passenger's injuries.
450 For example, commonly prescribed tranquilizers can cause photosensitivity and skin
eruptions, Parkinson-like symptoms, corneal opacities, and agranulocytosis [an acute disease
characterized by an abnormally low white blood corpuscle count and ulcerative lesions in
the throat, other mucous membranes, the gastro-intestinal tract, and the skin]. RoBrrSCHER,
supra note 19, at 78. And approximately 20% of the patients put on a program of carefully
administered insulin shock therapy sustain bone fractures because of unintended convul-
sions that occur later. Mitchell v. Robinson, 334 S.W.2d 11, 13 (Mo. 1960).
In addition, the therapies are often unpleasant. Anetine (drug) treatments cause "con-
siderable tension and apprehension, soreness of body muscles, prolonged respiratory arrest
. . .and a state of total body paralysis often likened to death or drowning." Prisoners and
Mental Patients, supra note 294, at 671. Electro-shock therapy induces convulsions which
have been described as " 'terrifying in the extreme.' The initial stage is likened to the ex-
perience of 'being electrocuted' or 'roasted in a white-hot furnace,' after which the shock ap-
parently rises 'to an acme of indescribable fear and terror.'" de Grazia, supra note 25, at
351. And the use of aversive stimuli, which eliminates undesirable behavior by making the
activity so distasteful for the subject that he no longer wishes to indulge in it, is by defini-
tion unpleasant.
451 Prisoners and Mental Patients, supra note 294, at 655.
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stimuli, for instance, may result in the trading of one mental illness for
another. A woman who was a kleptomaniac was successfully cured of her
shoplifting tendencies by repeatedly showing her a film where by-standers
registered expressions of horror and disgust as they watched such a theft
taking place; the patient was also given an electric shock when the shop-
lifting occurred in the movie. Although she stopped stealing after this treat-
ment, she later reported feelings of intense uneasiness and nervousness when-
ever she entered a store. 5 ' While many may prefer her new affliction, it is
debatable whether the woman herself is any more comfortable with it.
The trade of one disability for another becomes more acute when
psycho-surgery is performed. For instance, prefrontal lobotomy-a technique
which was widely used some years ago, but has since fallen into disrepute---'
has the desirable effect of reducing aggressive drives which may be respon-
sible for criminal behavior. However, while the problem of violence is
eliminated, the patient may be reduced to a vegetative state and just as
unlikely to do anything useful as he is to do something destructive." '
Newer methods of psycho-surgery, which destroy only small, selective areas
of the brain, moderate this extreme result;'5 nevertheless, because treatment
is irreversible, any alteration of personality becomes extremely significant
and warrants careful consideration before permitting a form of therapy that
produces it.
If consent prior to all mental treatment were required, a person would
have a "right" to treatment only if he willingly submitted himself to such
treatment with a full awareness of the consequences, which is standard
procedure when physical illnesses are involved.' 8 Moreover, since treatment
for mental illness can interfere with one's choice of destiny in a way that
treatment for physical illness does not, the argument in favor of informed
consent before treatment is even more compelling in the former case. Such
an approach could invalidate any ground for civil commitment other than
dangerousness.' 5
The problem with this analysis is that consent, which implies capacity
to consent, may be impossible in the case of mental illness since the disease
itself may prevent such capacity. For example, it may be impossible to obtain
consent from a severely ill catatonic schizophrenic who is extremely dis-
452 Singer, Psychological Studies of Punishment, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 405, 433 (1970).
453 Culliton, Psychosurgery: National Commission Issues Surprisingly Favorable Report, 194
SCIENCE 299 (1976).
454 H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 56-57 (1968).
455 See Culliton, supra note 453, at 300; Mitchell-Heggs, Kelly & Richardson, Stereotactic
Limbic Leucotomy: A Follow-Up at 16 Months, 128 BRITISH J. PSYCH. 226 (1976).
456 A. MoRrrz & C. STETLER, HANDBOOK OF LEGAL MEDICINE 129 (1964).
457 See text accompanying note 437 supra.
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oriented or from a paranoid patient whose refusal of treatment is a product
of his illness. '58 To allow a person to deteriorate, disregarding distortions
in his inner and outer world, may be as destructive of human life and dignity
as to treat him "against his will.""59 A solution might be to allow coerced
treatment on therapeutic grounds where a clinical determination shows that
the patient is in a state analogous to "unconsciousness"' 60 so that consent is
impossible. Such coercive treatment is similar to that given to one in a diabetic
coma, for instance, and can be analogized to the emergency exception to
unauthorized treatment for physical illnesses. It can be justified on the
ground that initial resistance to treatment was not a "free" choice. '61
In this scheme a duty to be treated would exist only for a limited period
of time during which the patient would be given the opportunity to acquire
the capacity to decide for or against treatment. Treatment during this time
would be restricted to "an exploration of resistance to treatment and thus
would extend only to an opportunity to learn to appreciate the value of
treatment and those who offer it." 6 ' Once "consciousness" is regained, the
mental patient would be free to reject further medical care.
Judged by the standards of commentators and the recent federal deci-
sions, the new Ohio statute does provide some protection against unwanted
therapeutic intervention, but does not go far enough. The statute provides
that
[T]he chief medical officer shall provide all information, including
expected physical and medical consequences, necessary to enable any
patient of a hospital for the mentally ill to give a fully informed, intelli-
gent and knowing consent, the opportunity to consult with independent
specialists and counsel and the right to refuse consent for any of the
following:
(1) surgery;
(2) convulsive therapy;
(3) programs involving aversive stimulae;
(4) sterilization;
(5) any unusually hazardous treatment procedures;
(6) psycho-surgery. 63
Both informed consent and court approval are required for sterilization,
458 Prisoners and Mental Patients, supra note 294, at 673.
459 Katz, supra note 48, at 770-71.
460 Id. at 770.
461 Prisoners and Mental Patients, supra note 294, at 675.
462 Katz, supra note 48, at 773.
463 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.271 (A) (Page Supp. 1976).
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and unusually hazardous treatment procedures and psychosurgery, unless
the patient is legally competent and has voluntarily entered a nonpublic
hospital. 6 ' Thus, certain forms of therapy can never be performed unless
the patient consents.
Ordinarily surgery and convulsive therapy may be performed without
the patient's consent if he is physically unable to receive and comprehend
the information required or has been adjudicated incompetent. '65 That this
part of the statute permits certain types of nonconsensual medical interven-
tion may be justified on the ground that these types of treatment usually
interfere less with the patient's autonomy. 6' Such treatment may make the
patient amenable to therapeutic intervention, resulting in greater intrapsychic
freedom so that he can exercise his free choice at a future date.6"' However,
the judgment is not left to the sole discretion of the medical personnel in-
volved. If the patient does not have legal capacity to consent, the relevant in-
formation may be provided to his guardian, who may consent knowingly and
intelligently to the proposed treatment. 66 To guard against bad faith judg-
ments or over-zealous judgments made in good faith, the statute provides
that "[i]n no case shall the guardianship of a mentally ill person be assigned
to the head of a hospital or any staff member of a hospital in which the person
is hospitalized." '69
More latitude for discretion is permitted in the case of a medical
emergency in which either surgery or convulsive therapy may be administered
without the consent of either the patient or his guardian." ' However, the
physician must obtain informed, knowing, and intelligent consent from the
patient's spouse or next of kin, if possible; otherwise the chief medical officer
must authorize the treatment.'
464 Id. § 5122.271 (B). The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects
of Biomedical and Behavioral Research has recommended some additional requirements.
It has proposed that each hospital performing psycho-surgery have an institutional review
board, composed of people with diverse backgrounds, which would ensure that the surgeon
who performs the operation is competent and that the patient is carefully evaluated, is
undergoing psycho-surgery for medically indicated reasons and has consented to the proposed
treatment. Culliton, supra note 453, at 301. It would have all HEW funding withdrawn
from any institution that violates any of the proposed regulations. Id. If these recommenda-
tions are accepted and enacted into law, such review boards may become part of Ohio
institutions, with or without state statutory compulsion. See text accompanying note 358
supra.
465 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.271 (C) (Page Supp. 1976).
466 But the Supreme Court of Minnesota has found electroshock therapy to be "intrusive"
and therefore subject to judicial approval if the patient does not consent. Price v. Sheppard,
239 N.W.2d 905 (Minn. 1976).
467 Katz, supra note 48, at 771.
468 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.271 (C) (Page Supp. 1976).
469 Id. § 5122.39 (B).
4 70 Id. § 5122.271 (D).
471 Id.
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Protection against the use of aversive stimuli falls somewhere between
that accorded psycho-surgery and that accorded convulsive therapy and
ordinary surgery. Aversive stimuli "may not be used unless a patient con-
tinues to engage in seriously self-destructive behavior after other forms of
therapy have been attempted, and informed, knowing and intelligent written
consent has been obtained from a guardian. "72 This amount of protection
is justifiable because aversive therapy intrudes more into the patient's indi-
viduality and is longer lasting than convulsive therapy; but it does not
interfere with the human personality as much as do more radical forms of
treatment such as lobotomy.'7 3
The statute does, though, unduly limit the use of aversive stimuli
which can be valuable and effective therapy, and which a legally competent
person should be able to choose if he so desires. Since a person may prefer
to suffer feelings of uneasiness when entering stores, for instance, than to
be subject to the social and perhaps criminal consequences of kleptomania,
there is no moral reason for the state to deny him that choice.
A major weakness in the present statute is the lack of protection
against the coercive use of chemo-therapy.' 7 " There is no doubt that drugs
are very useful in the treatment of the mentally ill as they can eliminate
the need for the physical restraint of a violent patient and can also make
an uncooperative patient docile and receptive to psycho-therapeutic tech-
niques. Yet it is also true that chemicals can interfere with human autonomy
by producing radical changes in the patient's behavior, "' changes which
may be long-lasting or even irreversible.' 6 Moreover, all drugs have risks
472 Id. § 5122.271 (E).
473 See Prisoners and Mental Patients, supra note 294, at 619-33. The Supreme Court of
Minnesota has held that the more intrusive forms of therapy require the consent of the
patient if not otherwise judicially found to be reasonable and necessary. Price v. Sheppard,
239 N.W.2d 905 (Minn. 1976).
474 An exception lies in the case where the patient is receiving spiritual treatment.
Unless there is substantial risk of physical harm to himself or others, or [unless
there is a medical emergency], this chapter does not authorize any form of compulsory
medical, psychological, or psychiatric treatment of any patient who is being treated
by spiritual means through prayer alone in accordance with a recognized religious
method of healing without specific court authorization.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.271 (F) (Page Supp. 1976) (emphasis added).
475 Katz, supra note 48, at 777.
476 For that reason electroshock therapy may be preferable to the administration of drugs
in cases where there is a choice of therapy. Some writers have urged that electro-convulsive
therapy is safe when carefully administered and cheaper and more effective than chemo-
therapy when used to treat endogenous depression; furthermore, "the misgivings which one
must have about the long-term use of psychopharmacologic agents are eliminated." Heshe &
Roeder, Electroconvulsive Therapy in Denmark, 128 BrrIsH J. PSYCH. 241, 245 (1976).
Considering this type of controversy within the profession, it makes little sense to impose
restrictions on shock therapy but leave involuntary medication virtually unrestrained.
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of serious physical side effects. '77 Thus, the statute should permit legally
competent people to refuse unwanted medication.
A second defect in the statute is that it sets no limit on the length of
time a person may be compelled to submit to treatment. Lack of any time
limit means that the issues concerning the constitutionality of confinement
and the psychiatric uncertainties about treatability may be postponed in-
definitely. 78
A third major weakness is that the statute does not define the require-
ments for informed consent. Presumably, the informed consent necessary
for non-tortious medical treatment will suffice. Elsewhere in the Code it is
provided that written consent shall be presumed to be valid and effective
when-
(A) The consent sets forth in general terms the nature and purpose
of the procedure or procedures, together with the known risks, if
any, of death, brain damage, quadriplegia [paralysis of all arms
and legs], paraplegia [paralysis of two legs], loss of function of
any organ or limb, or disfiguring scars associated with such pro-
cedure or procedures, with the probability of each such risk if
reasonably determinable;
(B) The person making the consent acknowledges that such disclosure
of information has been made and that all questions asked about
the procedure or procedures have been answered in a satisfactory
manner;
(C) The consent is signed by the patient for whom the procedure is
to be performed, or, if the patient . . . lacks legal capacity to
consent, by a person who has legal authority to consent on behalf
of such patient in such circumstances. '
47 I'd. In In re Lundquist, No. 140151 (Probate Ct., Ramsey County, Minn., April 30,
1976), the court permitted a woman who had voiced a fear that her family was trying to
control her life with medication to refuse to take Proloxin, a widely used form of drug
treatment, if not otherwise found to be reasonable and necessary. The court held the drug
to be an "intrusive therapy" because it may produce changes in the patient's mental process
lasting from four to eight weeks, and there is no known way to counteract the effects of
the drug. Because of this effect, a federal district court has held that an allegation of
forcible administration of psychotropic drugs was sufficient to maintain a first amendment
claim for unwarranted governmental intrusion into a patient's thought processes. Souder v.
McGuire, No. 74-590 (M.D. Pa., Dec. 9, 1976), summarized in I MENTAL DISABILITY L.
REP. 264 (1977). But see In re Fussa, No. 46912 (Minn. June 14, 1976), summarized in
1 MENTAL DISABILrrY L. REP. 332 (1977), where the Supreme Court of Minnesota effec-
tively nullified any precedential value of the Lundquist decision; the court found Proloxin
therapy to be similar to a penicillin injection and therefore permissible without a hearing
to consider changes in behavior patterns, risks of adverse side effects, or the experimental
nature of the treatment. Such a hearing would have been required had the drug been found
to be "instrusive."
478 Katz, supra note 48, at 773.
49 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2317.54 (Page Supp. 1976).
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The statute also permits the patient to waive knowledge of the details of
the more unlikely problems after a general discussion of common problems
and alternate methods of treatment."8"
It is indeed questionable whether this standard adequately protects the
patient from unknowing or unwilling submission to the risks of treatment.
It appears to allow the therapist to disclose only a minimal amount of in-
formation. Although the most hideous risks must be revealed, the physician
need not tell the patient for instance, that fractured bones may result from
convulsive therapy; nor need he indicate that new emotional problems may
result from the use of aversive stimuli. Also, to place the burden of asking
questions on the patient is unsatisfactory since the patient may be unable
to ask the appropriate questions.
A better standard would be to insist that practitioners provide a patient
with sufficient information to make a fully rational choice concerning his
treatment. This would include a full explanation of the nature, purpose,
expected duration and benefits to be expected from the therapy. The method
by which the therapy is to be administered and any known hazards, together
with the likelihood of occurrence, should also be revealed. Rational choice
means that benefits and risks of alternative therapies, or no therapy at all,
are made known. In discussing the merits of any treatment, the therapist
should also reveal how it will affect the quality of the patient's life. Given
this information, the patient may decide that he would prefer more radical
treatment of short duration to continuous chemo-therapy that would inter-
fere with his mental processes over a long period of time. '81
480 Id. § 2317.54 (D).
481 Prisoners and Mental Patients, supra note 294, at 675-76. Using this standard, the Cali-
fornia statute comes much closer to reaching the ideal. It provides that:
To constitute voluntary informed consent, the following information shall be given to
the patient in a clear and explicit manner:
(a) The reason for treatment, that is, the nature and seriousness of the patient's ill-
ness, disorder or defect.
(b) The nature of the procedures to be used in the proposed treatment, including its
probable frequency and duration.
(c) The probable degree and duration (temporary or permanent) of improvement
or remission, expected with or without such treatment.
(d) The nature, degree, duration, and the probability of the side effects and signifi-
cant risks, commonly known by the medical profession, of such treatment, includ-
ing its adjuvants, especially noting the degree and duration of memory loss
(including its irreversibility) and how and to what extent they may be controlled,
if at all.
(e) That there exists a division of opinion as to the efficacy of the proposed treatment,
why and how it works and its commonly known risks and side effects.
(f) The reasonable alternative treatments, and why the physician is recommending
this particular treatment.
(g) That the patient has the right to accept or refuse the proposed treatment, and
that if he or she consents, has the right to revoke his or her consent for any reason,
at any time prior to or between treatments.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.2 (West Supp. 1977).
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Some medical practitioners have opposed the doctrine of informed
consent on the ground that some patients may be made more apprehensive
by knowledge of all possible risks, and their recovery may be retarded by
this nervousness. 8 ' They fear that some patients may even refuse needed
treatment if they were aware of all the things that could go wrong.8"
However, this fear would appear to be remote if the therapist takes the time
to explain the benefits to be expected from the treatment, the fact that some
risks are indeed very remote, the possibilities of other forms of treatment
and the advantages and disadvantages of them, as well as the risks of refusing
any sort of treatment at all. If done properly, full disclosure could very
well increase the patient's confidence in the therapist, which should aid
recovery rather than retard it. Most importantly, it is only after full dis-
closure that the patient can be said to have a voice in the charting of his
own destiny.
CONCLUSION
The new Ohio Mental Health Act is a substantial improvement over
the old law. The new definition of "mental illness" and the criteria for
involuntary confinement are more objective; there must be some manifesta-
tion of illness evidenced in the person's past behavior. Commitment itself
has been made more of a legal judgment in that only a court can order
long-term involuntary hospitalization; emergency hospitalization based on a
written statement by a psychiatrist, licensed clinical psychologist, licensed
physician, health or police officer or sheriff is permitted only for a period
of three court days. The procedures known as non-protest hospitalization
and emergency hospitalization with a medical certificate have been abolished.
Furthermore, the process of commitment has been made more adversarial
in nature; the person alleged to be mentally ill is entitled to representation
by counsel, to be present at the hearing, to subpoena witnesses and to ex-
amine and cross-examine witnesses. Commitment is prohibited if there is
a less restrictive alternative.
If commitment is found necessary, the patient must be treated so that
he has a maximum chance of being able to live in the community again.
482 See, e.g., Lester v, Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 240 F.2d 676, 679 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 354 U.S. 923 (1957) (in judgment of psychiatrist it was unsafe and unwise to re-
quire patient to "undergo the strain and shock of discussing and considering the possible,
though not probable, hazards" of electroshock treatments); Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr.
University Board of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 578, 317 P.2d 170, 181 (1957)
(disclosing all risks may make a patient unduly apprehensive and actually increasc risks
"by reason of the physiological results of the apprehension itself"); Miceikis v. Field, 37
Ill. App. 3d 763, 767, 347 N.E.2d 320, 323 (1976) (doctor testified that "it is not good
medical practice to recount every potential complication in each case as it could be fright-
ening and at odds with the patient's best interests").
483 See ROBITSCHER, supra note 19, at 78.
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Perhaps even more significant is the provision for refusal of certain treat-
ment procedures, such as electroshock therapy and psycho-surgery. While
confined, the patient is to be treated humanely and respectfully, and he is
to retain his civil rights to the fullest extent possible.
However, there still remains room for improvement. In a country
which has such great respect for the individual, no one should be confined
against his will unless he has committed some act that infringes on the rights
of others. Neither can coerced treatment be justified other than in cases
where the person is so ill that he is unable to make an intelligent choice.
In all other cases the law should provide that a patient be fully informed
of the various forms of treatment available and of their likely effects, both
on his body and his personality; then, if the treatment is not deemed
desirable by the patient, he should have an absolute right to refuse it.
Whether or not the Act will actually bring about better conditions
for the mentally ill depends upon its enforcement. For instance, Ohio has
had a statutory right to treatment and humane care for many years; yet
the deplorable conditions found to exist by the task force were permitted
to come into being. Likewise, a right to counsel does not protect a person
at a commitment hearing if the representation is inadequate or if the court
does not fully enforce all procedural rights." ' The root of the problem appears
to lie in our attitude toward the mentally ill; unless someone cares enough
484 A Milwaukee County Circuit judge recently found that those accused of mental illness
had been denied effective assistance of counsel and due process of law, in violation of their
constitutional rights. In regard to the quality of legal representation by court-appointed
attorneys he found that:
(1) the full compensation for a typical case was $25.45;
(2) only one case had been tried to a jury during a period of over a year in which
approximately 1,238 applications had been filed;
(3) the attorneys had waived the right to file written motions in all the cases filed
during the same period;
(4) the right to appeal by way of habeas corpus had never been explained to any of
the persons accused of mental illness;
(5) the right to file writs of habeas corpus was waived in 99 per cent of 838 cases;
(6) no lawsuits seeking to invalidate commitments were brought by the appointed
attorneys;
(7) the attorneys typically failed to object to irregularities in the evidence presented
by those seeking commitment;
(8) witnesses were usually not cross examined;
(9) subpoenas were virtually never sought; and
(10) preliminary hearing transcripts were virtually never sought.
His conclusion was that
A lawyer who does nothing, or who assists the prosecution, is obviously not the effective
assistance of counsel that is envisioned by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the Constitution. These petitioners would undoubtedly have been better off without any
counsel who became part of the prosecution effort to detain or commit them.
State ex rel. Memmel v. Mundy, No 441-417 (Milwaukee Co. Cir. Ct., Wis., Aug. 18, 1976),
reported in I MENTAL DISABILIY L. REP. 183 (1976), aff'd, 75 Wis. 2d 276, 249 N.W.2d
573 (1977).
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to protest, statutory rights are of no avail. In the past, no one has complained
and obtained a successful result. Once the furor caused by litigation and
investigation has died down, the conditions that appeared to be remedied
by statute may again appear. While it may be too much to expect society to
revise its attitude overnight, and thus protect the statutory rights that have
been created, the statute provides an additional safeguard to protect the rights
of the mentally ill: the legal rights service. The creation of a group whose
specific job is to oversee those rights means that there is an entity which
is not dependent on public sentiment, on public officials performing their
jobs in accordance with the statutory requirements, or on the patients them-
selves, who are often unable to assert their rights effectively. If the legal
rights service performs its duties diligently, its creation may well be the most
important part of the new law; it may become the agency by which the
newly enacted rights for the mentally ill are made an actuality.
JANICE GTi
SANDRA S. BRADIN
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* Martin J. Marz contributed research for Part IIi, New Substantive Rights for .Ohi's.
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